THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

IN  MEMORY  OF 
MRS.  VIRGINIA  B.  SPORER 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE  PROBLEM  OF 
FOREIGN  POLICY 

A  CONSIDERATION  OF  PRESENT 
DANGERS  AND  THE  BEST 
METHODS  FOR  MEETING  THEM 

BY 
GILBERT  MURRAY 

AUTHOR  OF  "THE  FOREIGN  POLICY  OF  SIR  EDWARD  GREY," 

"THE  RELIGION  OF  A  MAN  OF  LETTERS," 

"FAITH,  WAR,  AND  POLICY,"  ETC. 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 
ftfretfibe  ptcstf  Cambcibge 
1921 


COPYRIGHT,    1931,    BY    GILBERT    MURRAY 
ALL  RIGHTS   RESERVED 


o 


PREFACE 

THE  publication  of  this  little  book  was  inter- 
rupted by  an  incident  which  made  me  realize 
how  easy  it  is  for  one  who  spends  much  time  in 
trying  to  study  sincerely  a  political  problem  to 
find  himself  out  of  touch  with  average  opinion. 
The  discovery  has  made  me  re-read  what  I 
have  written.  But  re-reading  has  not  led  to  any 
weakening  of  my  expressions,  rather  the  re- 
verse. I  wish  only  to  make  a  brief  general  state- 
ment about  the  point  of  view  from  which  I 
write. 

I  start  from  the  profound  conviction  that 
what  the  world  needs  is  peace.  There  has  been 
too  much  war,  and  too  much  of  many  things 
that  naturally  go  with  war  ;  too  much  force  and 
fraud,  too  much  intrigue  and  lying,  too  much 
impatience,  violence,  avarice,  unreasonable- 
ness, and  lack  of  principle.  Before  the  war  I 
was  a  Liberal,  and  I  believe  now  that  nothing 
but  the  sincere  practice  of  Liberal  principles 

v 


2040716 


PREFACE 

will  save  European  society  from  imminent  rev- 
olution and  collapse.  But  I  am  conscious  of 
a  certain  change  of  emphasis  in  my  feeling. 
Before  the  war  I  was  eager  for  large  and  sweep- 
ing reforms,  I  was  intolerant  of  Conservatism 
and  I  laughed  at  risks.  The  social  order  had 
then  such  a  margin  of  strength  that  risks  could 
safely  be  taken.  Now  I  feel  a  need  above  all 
things  of  the  qualities  that  will  preserve  civ- 
ilization. For  that  preservation,  of  course, 
Liberality  in  the  full  sense  is  necessary,  and 
constant  progress  and  a  great  development  of 
democracy. 

But  what  is  needed  most  is  a  return  to  a 
standard  of  public  conduct  which  was  prac- 
tised, or  at  least  recognized,  by  the  best  Gov- 
ernments of  the  world  before  the  war,  and 
which  now  seems  to  have  been  shaken,  if  not 
shattered.  I  am  not  demanding  in  any  wild 
idealist  spirit  that  Governments  should  act  ac- 
cording to  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  —  though 
they  well  might  study  it  a  good  deal  more  than 
they  do.  I  am  only  saying  that  they  must  get 
back  to  the  standard  of  veracity,  of  consistency, 

vi 


PREFACE 

of  honesty  and  economy,  and  of  intellectual 
competence,  that  we  had  from  Peel  or  Lord 
Salisbury  or  Gladstone. 

I  do  not  say  that  is  enough.  It  is  emphati- 
cally not  enough.  We  need  in  foreign  policy 
and  home  policy  a  higher  standard  than  we  had 
before,  the  standard  implied  by  the  League  of 
Nations  in  international  affairs  and  the  ideal 
of  Coo'peration  in  domestic  affairs.  But  the 
first  thing  is  to  recover  our  wholesome  tradi- 
tion. 

I  think  few  serious  students  of  public  affairs 
will  dispute  that  the  long  strain  of  the  war,  con- 
fusing our  ideas  of  good  and  evil,  and  at  times 
centring  our  hopes  upon  things  which  a  normal 
civilized  man  regards  with  loathing,  has  re- 
sulted in  a  widespread  degradation  of  political 
conduct.  Things  are  done  now,  in  time  of 
peace,  which  would  have  been  inconceivable 
before  1914.  And  they  are  done  now  because 
we  grew  accustomed  to  worse  things  during  the 
war.  I  do  not  wish  to  attack  any  individuals; 
but,  as  an  instance  of  what  I  mean,  one  finds 
a  Ministerial  newspaper  complacently  remark- 
vii 


PREFACE 

ing  that  certain  country  towns  sacked  by  the 
police  in  Ireland  were  very  small  and  poor 
places  in  any  case,  and  the  sacking  not  nearly 
so  complete  as  the  sacking  of  Belgian  towns  by 
the  Germans  on  less  provocation.  I  find  to-day 
(November  4,  1920)  the  Chief  Secretary  for 
Ireland  announcing  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  he  has  had  a  court  of  inquiry  into  the  al- 
leged murder  of  John  Conway  by  the  police, 
and  presenting  an  official  report  that  Conway 
14 died  from  natural  causes";  while  at  the  same 
time  the  Times  special  correspondent  writes: 
"  I  went  to  the  cottage  in  Rock  Street  of  John 
Conway,  who  was  shot  on  Monday  evening, 
and  saw  him  lying  on  his  bed  with  a  bullet 
wound  in  the  temple."  This  is  one  case  out  of 
dozens.  It  is  not  a  slip  or  an  isolated  crime. 
I  put  it  to  any  man  who  can  remember  the 
years  before  the  war  that  this  represents  a 
startling  degradation  of  the  standard  of  govern- 
ment. Such  things  used  to  happen  in  Mexico; 
now  they  happen  in  Great  Britain. 

Of  course  I  supported  the  war.    I  believe  it 
was  necessary.   I  make  no  self-righteous  claim 
viii 


PREFACE 

to  throw  the  guilt  of  it  upon  others,  who  did  the 
fighting  by  which  I  and  mine  were  saved.  Let 
me  therefore  try  to  make  clear  why  certain 
things  shock  me  profoundly,  while  I  supported 
others  which  can  loosely  be  called  "just  as 
bad." 

One  of  the  worst  things  about  war,  as  Thu- 
cydides  has  remarked,  is  that  it  takes  away 
your  freedom  and  puts  you  in  a  region  of  ne- 
cessity. You  may  choose  whether  or  not  to 
fight;  but,  once  fighting,  your  power  of  choice 
has  gone. 

Take  the  treaty  with  Italy  in  1915.  Italy 
demanded  a  certain  price,  if  she  was  to  come 
into  the  war  on  our  side.  Another  party  in 
Italy  was  negotiating  with  the  Germans,  to  see 
what  inducement  could  be  offered  for  Italy  to 
come  in  on  the  other  side.  (I  make  no  com- 
plaint whatever  of  the  conduct  of  these  Italian 
statesmen;  they  naturally  consulted  the  inter- 
ests of  their  country.)  The  price  was  high,  and 
involved  the  transference  to  Italy  of  territory 
to  which,  on  principles  of  self-determination, 
she  had  little  claim.  But  who  could  refuse  the 

ix 


PREFACE 

i 

price?  War  "is  a  violent  master  and  teaches 
by  compulsion." 

Take  the  blockade  of  Germany.  It  was  a 
slow  and  somewhat  cruel  weapon  to  employ, 
falling  most  severely  on  the  most  innocent 
classes.  But  Germany  was  trying  to  blockade 
us,  and  only  our  superior  strength  and  skill 
at  sea  caused  her  plan  to  fail.  It  was  part  of 
the  normal  means  of  war,  and  of  course  we 
used  it. 

Then  came  an  extension  of  it.  Poland,  most 
unhappy  of  European  nations,  was  swept  by 
alternate  armies,  conquered  by  the  Germans, 
devastated  and  laid  bare.  The  Poles  were  our 
allies.  Our  newspapers  had  accounts  of  the 
appalling  distress  in  Poland  —  the  roads  strewn 
with  skeletons,  the  almost  complete  blotting- 
out  of  children  under  seven,  and  the  like.  The 
Americans  proposed  to  send  food  for  the  relief 
of  the  Poles.  But  we  made  objection.  We  did 
not  allow  food  to  go  into  Poland,  to  save  our 
own  allies,  who  were  starving.  Why?  Because 
the  Germans  were  still  taking  from  the  miser- 
able country  all  the  food  they  could  wring  out 

x 


PREFACE 

of  it.  And  if  the  Americans  brought  in  more 
food,  undoubtedly  the  enemy  would  take  more. 
There  was  no  choice.  We  had  to  refuse  the 
entry  of  the  food  ships.  But  the  man  who  had 
to  sign  that  order  may  well  have  wished  he  had 
died  before  the  need  came  to  him. 

These  results  and  necessities  of  war,  though 
I  have  chosen  none  of  a  sensational  kind,  are 
very  horrible.  It  is  not  easy  to  think  of  actions 
much  more  horrible.  But  they  are  not  exactly 
crimes,  they  are  not  marks  of  degradation  in 
those  who  order  them,  because  they  are  done 
under  the  compulsion  of  war.  The  alternative 
in  each  case  is  something  equivalent  to  helping 
the  enemy. 

At  the  end  of  the  war,  after  the  signing  of  an 
armistice  on  the  basis  of  the  Fourteen  Points, 
there  came  at  last  a  moment  of  free  choice.  It 
came  after  five  years  of  unspeakable  waste  — 
five  years  during  which  the  nations  of  Europe 
had  become  habituated  to  cruelty  and  "all  pity 
choked  with  custom  of  fell  deeds."  I  am  anx- 
ious to  avoid  the  faintest  semblance  of  heat  or 
exaggeration,  but  I  think  it  can  hardly  be  dis- 

xi 


PREFACE 

puted  that  practically  every  economist  agreed 
that  Europe  was  on  the  brink  of  economic  ruin 
and  could  only  be  saved  by  a  quick  revival  of 
trade;  every  man  of  conscience,  irrespective  of 
political  party,  knew  that  the  first  condition 
for  the  recovery  of  civilization  was  a  change 
from  the  war  mind  to  the  peace  mind.  Such 
a  change  could  not  happen  in  a  night.  It  must 
needs  be  gradual.  It  could  only  be  brought 
about  by  a  strong  and  persistent  lead  from 
those  who  possessed  the  ear  of  the  world  and 
the  confidence  of  their  own  people.  Never  in 
the  whole  course  of  modern  history  has  there 
been  a  more  magnificent  opportunity  than  then 
lay  before  the  British  Prime  Minister,  never  has 
there  been  a  clearer  call  of  plain  duty.  He  was 
free,  as  men  in  public  life  are  seldom  free. 
Great  Britain  hung  on  his  lips,  and  Europe  was 
waiting  for  the  lead  of  Great  Britain.  It  was 
for  him  to  choose  plain  good  or  plain  evil.  And 
he  chose,  deliberately,  evil.  He  dissolved  Par- 
liament and  appealed  to  the  country  in  a  Gen- 
eral Election  on  a  programme  of  frantic  war 
passion,  coupled  with  promises  which  he  knew 
xii 


PREFACE 

to  be  false,  and  which  were  ridiculed  by  every 
educated  man  among  his  surroundings.  This 
man  had  before  him  a  task  and  an  opportunity 
so  glorious  that  one  can  scarcely  speak  of  it  ex- 
cept in  the  language  of  religion.  Many  ordi- 
nary men  would  willingly  give  their  lives  if 
they  could  save  their  fellow  creatures  from  suf- 
ferings and  perils  far  less  terrible  than  those 
which  then  threatened.  And  he  could  have 
saved  them  without  any  sacrifice.  It  needed 
only  a  little  courage.  For  a  week  or  ten  days  he 
hesitated.  Then  on  December  1 1  he  proclaimed 
his  programme :  the  Kaiser's  head ;  the  punish- 
ment of  enemy  war-criminals ;  Germany  to  pay 
the  whole  cost  of  the  war;  Britain  for  the  Brit- 
ish ;  rehabilitation  of  those  whom  the  war  had 
broken. 

At  the  time  when  this  programme  was  put 
forward  I  felt  bewildered.  I  did  not  realize  that 
any  one  could  be,  I  will  not  say  so  wicked,  but 
so  curiously  destitute  of  generous  ambition,  so 
incapable  of  thinking  greatly.  And  when  I  tried 
to  find  out  what  motive  could  lie  at  the  back  of 
a  failure  so  incredible,  I  was  told  by  his  sup- 
xiii 


PREFACE 

porters  that  the  Prime  Minister  was  not  think- 
ing about  the  matters  of  which  I  was  thinking. 
He  was  trying  to  get  a  very  large  majority  in 
the  House  of  Commons  and  to  crush  his  old 
colleagues,  and  conceivable  rivals,  entirely  out 
of  existence.  Of  course  he  succeeded. 

I  hope  I  have  put  this  statement  forward 
without  any  malice  or  party  feeling.  The  state 
of  the  world  is  far  too  serious  to  permit  of 
either.  And  I  hope  that  the  profound  and 
burning  indignation  which  I  undoubtedly  feel 
has  not  biased  my  judgment.  In  any  case,  the 
conclusion  that  I  wish  to  draw  is  not  a  per- 
sonal but  a  general  one.  I  doubt  if  such  action 
would  have  been  possible  before  the  war  in  any 
constitutional  statesman,  not  to  speak  of  a 
clever  and  humane  man  like  Mr.  George.  I 
doubt  if  the  public  opinion  of  any  nation  would 
have  endured  it.  A  nation  in  which  such  con- 
duct is  tolerated,  and  even  approved,  ought 
surely  to  pause  and  bethink  itself.  For  it  is  not 
a  particular  reckless  or  unfortunate  act  which 
is  thus  condoned ;  it  is  a  way  of  behaviour.  It  is 
a  way  of  behaviour  which  has  its  origin  in  the 
xiv 


PREFACE 

methods  of  war,  and  of  which  the  characteristic 
is  that  it  gives  the  unscrupulous  man  the  ad- 
vantage over  the  scrupulous  man,  the  cheat 
over  the  honest  player,  the  violent  and  the 
criminal  over  those  who  obey  the  law.  It  fos- 
ters exactly  those  things  which  it  is  the  business 
of  civilized  society  to  prevent.  There  are  al- 
ways lawless  and  dishonest  men  in  every  large 
community,  as  there  are  criminals  in  every 
army.  There  are  always  men  who  make  profit 
out  of  their  neighbours'  extremity,  who  use  ad- 
vertisement to  stifle  truth,  who  jeer  at  all  that 
is  higher  than  themselves.  But  in  a  good  social 
order  they  are  not  influential.  They  acquire 
power  only  in  a  society  which,  in  external  con- 
duct, is  losing  its  traditional  standards  and 
inwardly,  in  the  words  of  Tolstoy's  great  con- 
demnation, has  forgotten  God. 

My  criticism  here  is  directed  against  my  own 
country,  and  in  particular  against  the  British 
Prime  Minister,  not  in  the  least  because  I  have 
any  anti-British  bias.  On  the  contrary,  I  think 
that  in  most  of  the  international  problems  of 
Europe  the  influence  of  Great  Britain,  and  in 
xv 


PREFACE 

particular  of  the  British  Prime  Minister,  is  gen- 
erally an  influence  for  good,  though  not  nearly 
such  a  strong  and  clear  influence  as  it  might  be. 
I  confine  these  criticisms  to  our  own  policy  be- 
cause the  scolding  of  foreign  countries  is  a  no- 
toriously profitless  task.  The  only  criticism 
that  has  any  chance  of  being  useful  is  that  of 
matters  for  which  the  critic  or  his  readers  have 
some  degree  of  responsibility. 

I  believe  profoundly  in  the  traditions  of  Lib- 
eral England.  As  every  one  knows  who  has 
cared  to  read  my  writings,  I  look  to  the  League 
of  Nations  as  the  main  hope  of  the  world,  and 
to  the  British  Commonwealth  as  the  mainstay 
of  the  League  of  Nations.  But,  if  it  was  ever 
doubtful,  it  is  surely  clear  in  the  present  state 
of  the  world  that  the  Commonwealth  cannot 
rest  upon  any  secure  foundation  except  the 
good-will  of  its  members.  And  that  good-will  in 
its  turn  depends  upon  equal  law,  good  govern- 
ment, and  good  faith. 

It  is  not  a  new  lesson  that  we  have  to  learn : 
it  is  an  old  lesson  that  good  Englishmen  once 
knew  better  than  any  rulers  the  world  has  ever 
xvi 


PREFACE 

seen,  though  five  years  of  madness  have  made  it 
largely  forgotten.  But,  as  Lord  Grey  has  said, 
the  choice  now  before  us  is  absolute;  we  must 
learn  or  perish. 

It  is  in  this  belief  and  this  spirit  that  I  have 
written  the  following  pages,  which  I  hope,  ex- 
cept to  those  who  still  live  in  some  unsubstan- 
tial paradise  of  war-bred  delusions,  will  cause 
no  permanent  offence,  nor  leave  the  impression 
that  where  I  think  others  have  made  mistakes 
I  imagine  that  I  should  make  none. 

Readers  will  see  that  I  have  aimed  through- 
out at  simplicity  of  outline.  I  have  deliberately 
focused  attention  on  the  one  central  problem, 
how  to  avoid  the  causes  of  international  strife. 
And  out  of  the  many  and  multifarious  difficul- 
ties that  confront  our  harassed  Foreign  Office 
to-day,  I  have  concentrated  on  a  few  typical 
cases.  I  have  omitted,  for  instance,  any  dis- 
cussion of  Turkey,  Armenia,  Persia,  Ireland, 
and  the  relations  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States.  I  have  omitted  Africa, 
where,  unless  the  white  man's  methods  of  ad- 
ministration are  reconsidered,  one  of  the  grav- 
xvii 


PREFACE 

est  of  the  world's  future  dangers  may  soon  be 
in  fermentation.  And  I  have  said  nothing  of 
the  economic  problem  in  Europe,  especially  in 
Austria.  The  International  Financial  Com- 
mission, summoned  at  Brussels  by  the  League 
of  Nations,  has  issued  a  report  on  this  matter 
which  no  government  can  afford  to  neglect. 
Its  first  recommendations  are  disarmament 
and  freedom  of  trade,  but  they  will  not  be 
enough  without  some  system  of  international 
credits  by  which  production  may  be  set  going 
among  those  populations  which  at  present 
have  neither  food  nor  raw  materials  nor  the 
means  of  buying  them. 

Since  an  edition  of  this  little  book  is  asked 
for  in  America  I  feel  constrained  to  add  a  few 
words  to  the  Preface.  It  will  be  seen  that  I 
have  said  nothing  about  two  subjects  of  the 
first  importance,  the  Irish  Question  and  the  re- 
lations between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  The  Irish  Question  is,  under  present 
conditions,  a  domestic  matter,  since  Ireland 
forms  by  law  part  of  the  United  Kingdom  and 
xviii 


PREFACE 

has  the  right  of  full  representation  in  the  Brit- 
ish Parliament.  It  only  touches  foreign  policy 
through  its  effect  on  foreign  opinion. 

I  do  not  therefore  propose  to  discuss  the 
Irish  Question  here.  Personally  I  believe  that 
a  favourable  prospect  of  settlement  is  to  be 
found  in  the  policy  advocated  by  Mr.  Asquith 
and  Lord  Grey,  and  loosely  called  "Dominion 
Home  Rule."  This  would  put  Ireland  roughly 
in  the  same  position  as  the  self-governing  Brit- 
ish colonies,  and  would  at  once  have  two  very 
important  effects.  It  would  put  an  end  to  the 
present  oppressions  and  would  give  Ireland  the 
right  to  a  seat  at  the  Assembly  of  the  League 
of  Nations.  But  I  fear  that  no  settlement 
whatever  is  possible  in  Ireland  until  the  present 
Government  is  replaced  by  some  other  with 
more  sincerity  in  its  purpose  and  less  blood 
upon  its  hands.  The  accounts  of  British  mis- 
deeds which  I  read  in  the  Sinn  Fein  Bulletin 
and  in  some  American  newspapers  appear  to 
me  to  be  both  exaggerated  and  one-sided.  Men 
exasperated  by  persecution  are  not  as  a  rule 
capable  of  giving  a  perfectly  fair  and  benevo- 
xix 


PREFACE 

lent  account  of  the  behaviour  of  their  persecu- 
tors. But  in  spite  of  the  Government's  policy 
of  rigorous  concealment,  the  Irish  can  now  ap- 
peal to  the  evidence  of  a  witness  as  nearly  un- 
impeachable as  can  be  expected  in  human  af- 
fairs, a  County  Court  Judge  appointed  origi- 
nally by  the  British  Government  itself.  Judge 
Bodkin,  in  a  report  submitted  to  the  British 
Government  on  cases  of  crime  which  came  be- 
fore his  Court  in  Clare  County  at  the  Hilary 
Sessions  of  1920,  states:  "There  were  in  all  139 
cases  in  which  it  was  proved  that  the  criminal 
injuries  were  committed  by  armed  forces  of  the 
Government,  and  only  in  the  five  cases  already 
mentioned  were  any  witnesses  examined  to 
justify,  deny,  or  explain.  In  no  case  was  there 
any  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  victims  had 
been  guilty  of  any  offence." 

In  answer  to  a  report  like  this  the  Govern- 
ment allows  no  public  inquiry,  inflicts,  so  far  as 
is  known,  no  punishment  on  the  criminals, 
awards  no  compensation  to  the  victims,  and 
yet  does  not  take  any  legal  steps  against  its  ac- 
cuser. Such  conduct  does  not  seem  compatible 

XX 


PREFACE 

with  innocence.  Indeed  the  complicity  of  the 
Government,  particularly  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
and  Sir  Hamar  Greenwood,  in  the  system  of 
illegal  outrages  called  "reprisals"  is  no  longer 
disputed,  and  has  especially  been  brought  out 
in  Parliament  by  a  conservative  member,  Mr. 
Oswald  Moseley.  The  exact  degree  of  complic- 
ity is,  of  course,  open  to  doubt.  If  I  may  give 
my  own  opinion  for  what  it  is  worth,  I  suspect 
that  at  some  time  when  the  Irish  police  forces 
were  disposed  to  resign  or  to  strike  owing  to 
the  constant  danger  of  assassination  in  which 
the  Government's  policy  required  them  to  live, 
the  Government  gave  their  officers  some  assur- 
ance that,  if  they  would  only  stay  on,  their  own 
conduct  in  dealing  with  Sinn  Feiners  would  not 
be  too  closely  scrutinized.  That  was  the  usual 
method  pursued  by  the  Czar's  Government 
when  arranging  pogroms. 

The  defence  of  the  British  Ministers  is  that 
they  were  faced  from  the  outset  by  a  very  diffi- 
cult situation,  owing  to  the  irreconcilable  dif- 
ferences between  the  northeast  corner  of  Ulster 
and  the  rest  of  Ireland.  Anxious  for  Tory  sup- 
xxi 


PREFACE 

port  they  gave  pledges,  the  exact  tenor  of  which 
has  not  been  divulged,  to  Sir  Edward  Carson, 
the  Ulster  leader,  and  thus  tied  their  own 
hands.  The  condition  of  Ireland  became  in- 
creasingly embittered,  till,  shortly  after  Sir 
Hamar  Greenwood's  appointment,  the  extreme 
Sinn  Fein  party,  refusing  parliamentary  action 
and  unable  to  meet  the  English  in  battle, 
adopted  a  policy  of  assassination.  The  Govern- 
ment, much  embarrassed,  did  just  what  most 
bad  governments  generally  have  done  in  other 
parts  of  the  world.  They  tried  to  stamp  out  the 
Sinn  Fein  terror  by  organizing  a  terror  of  their 
own,  meeting  crime  by  still  more  formidable 
crime,  and  recklessly  confusing  the  innocent 
with  the  guilty.  At  last  they  have  succeeded  in 
uniting  all  Catholic  Ireland  in  such  detestation 
of  the  British  name  that  an  Irishman  will  now 
never  betray  another  Irishman,  however  guilty, 
to  the  British  police,  nor  even  feel  that  the  kill- 
ing of  an  Englishman  is  quite  the  same  thing  as 
murder.  "Things  being  in  this  state,"  the  Gov- 
ernment pleads,  "how  can  we  be  expected  to 
govern  Ireland  according  to  civilized  stand- 
xxii 


PREFACE 

ards?"  The  answer  is  that  they  cannot,  and 
had  better  make  room  for  another  Government 
which  can. 

I  cannot  tell  how  great  an  effect  this  Irish 
calamity  has  had  in  embittering  the  relations 
between  America  and  Great  Britain.  I  would 
only  venture  to  lay  before  Americans  of  moder- 
ate views  my  conviction  that  the  great  mass  of 
educated  opinion  in  England  joins  "with  the 
Free  Liberals  and  the  Labour  Party  in  utterly 
condemning  the  Government's  Irish  admin- 
istration. This  conclusion  is  derived  from 
personal  conversation  with  people  of  various 
parties,  and  from  the  overwhelming  anti- 
Government  votes  in  the  bye-elections,  and 
the  increasing  protests  and  rebellions  among 
the  Government's  supporters  in  Parliament.  I 
have  to  admit  that  this  condemnation  is  not  re- 
flected in  the  House  of  Commons  as  a  whole,  an 
utterly  abnormal  House  elected  in  a  moment 
when  not  only  the  fever  of  war,  but  many  other 
fevers  and  corruptions  of  the  body  politic  were 
at  their  height.  It  is  not  even  reflected  ade- 
quately in  the  press.  For  the  press  in  England, 
xxiii 


PREFACE 

with  a  few  most  honourable  exceptions,  is  in  the 
hands  of  a  small  number  of  individuals  who  — 
to  say  the  least  of  it  —  were  not  elected  to  their 
present  position  of  power  by  the  confidence  of 
their  countrymen  nor  appointed  thereto  on 
grounds  of  intellect  or  character  or  public 
spirit.  England  is  admittedly  not  in  a  very 
healthy  state  of  mind.  But,  even  now,  at  her 
worst,  she  is  a  far  better  and  more  decent  coun- 
try than  could  be  concluded  from  either  the 
London  press  or  the  House  of  Commons. 

The  picture  I  have  given  of  European  affairs 
may,  I  can  well  see,  be  taken  in  either  of  two 
ways  by  an  American.  It  may  well  confirm  his 
determination  to  keep  absolutely  clear  of  a 
world  at  once  so  ill-directed  and  so  miserable. 
The  case  for  American  isolation  is  very  easy  to 
state  and  to  understand.  What  is  there  to  at- 
tract America  towards  further  cooperation  with 
any  of  the  larger  European  nations?  France?  I 
can  imagine  no  sane  statesmen  wishing  to  be 
drawn  into  the  orbit  of  France  in  her  present 
mood  or  with  her  present  prospects.  Germany  ? 
The  existing  German  Government  seems  good, 
xxiv 


PREFACE 

but  old  enmities  do  not  so  quickly  die  down, 
and  Germany  has  still  to  prove  that  she  is  an 
honest  and  a  peaceful  power.  Russia?  To  ask 
the  question  is  to  answer  it.  England?  Who 
would  wish  to  cooperate  with  the  British  Gov- 
ernment in  holding  down  Ireland  by  "competi- 
tion in  crime,"  in  reestablishing  her  slippery 
grasp  on  Mesopotamia,  laboriously  pacifying 
India  and  Egypt,  and  struggling  indefinitely 
against  Russian  conspiracies  to  destroy  her  in- 
fluence in  the  Moslem  world?  How  can  an 
American  wish  to  remit  England's  debt  to 
America  when  she  is  at  this  moment  invading 
Germany  in  order  to  collect  "to  the  last  far- 
thing" a  claim  which  the  American  delegates  at 
the  Peace  Conference  rejected  as  extortionate? 
And  who  would  wish  to  increase  the  wealth  of  a 
Government  which,  immediately  after  the  War 
to  end  War,  is  lavishing  all  it  can  afford,  and 
more,  on  armaments  and  military  expeditions? 
Other  less  plausible  arguments  could  easily  be 
added.  The  suggestion,  for  instance,  that  this 
country,  or  any  party  or  any  fraction  of  a  party 
in  this  country,  intends  or  ever  intended  to  use 
xxv 


PREFACE 

the  Japanese  Alliance  for  a  war  against  the 
United  States  is  the  merest  moonshine,  and  has 
been  repeatedly  disproved  by  the  terms  of  the 
old  treaty  and  by  the  public  statements  of  both 
parties.  But,  taking  only  arguments  that  have 
some  basis  of  truth,  the  case  for  American  iso- 
lation is  very  strong. 

And  yet  it  is  the  wrong  case.  It  is  based,  I 
venture  to  think,  first  on  a  misunderstanding, 
and  next  on  too  narrow  a  point  of  view.  A  mis- 
understanding ;  because  it  is  not  cooperation  in 
that  sense  which  is  asked  of  her.  She  is  not 
asked  to  support  the  policies  of  any  European 
nation.  The  League  of  Nations  is  not  an  alli- 
ance. She  is  asked  only  to  sit  in  council  with  the 
other  nations  —  as  free  and  unpledged  as  they, 
or,  if  she  wishes,  still  more  so  —  to  help  those 
who  have  suffered,  and  are  in  part  still  sick  in 
body  and  brain  with  their  suffering,  to  face  the 
vast  problems  which  now  confront  mankind, 
and  which  the  rest  of  us  have  pledged  ourselves 
to  face  in  the  spirit  of  peace  and  justice  and 
common  sense  which  we  thought  was  charac- 
teristically American.  It  is  based  on  too  nar- 
xxvi 


PREFACE 

row  a  view,  because  all  summary  judgments  of 
foreign  nations  are  that,  whether  they  end  in 
praise  or  blame.  "La  noble,  Tincomparable 
Angleterre  "  of  M.  Briand  is  just  as  remote  from 
fact  as  the  "brutal  and  bloody  Britain"  of  Mr. 
Hearst.  Nations  are  made  up  of  masses  of  in- 
dividuals, who  differ  among  themselves  within 
each  nation  just  about  as  much  as  the  citizens 
of  one  nation  differ  from  those  of  another.  In 
every  nation  there  are  numbers  of  criminals 
and  numbers  of  fine  men.  In  every  nation's 
past  there  are  black  places  and  white.  Only  it 
so  happens  that  just  now,  after  a  time  of  hide- 
ous suffering  and  wrong-doing,  in  the  midst  of  a 
time  of  savage  resentments  and  passions  and 
great  material  difficulties,  the  nations  of  the 
world  are  from  the  depth  of  their  hearts  long- 
ing for  some  way  of  avoiding  war  and  treating 
one  another  in  future  a  little  more  openly  and 
fairly  than  they  have  in  the  past.  They  know 
they  must  have  disputes,  and  that  when  the 
disputes  come  it  is  one  of  two  things ;  they  must 
either  talk  them  out  or  fight  them  out.  They 
are  meeting  to  talk  them  out.  But  how  can  the 
xxvii 


PREFACE 

talk  be  quite  frank  and  free,  or  how  can  the 
promises  of  peace  and  fair  dealing  carry  full 
conviction,  while  the  greatest  and  the  least 
wounded  of  all  the  nations  refuses  to  join  in 
them,  but  sits  aloof  in  silence,  from  time  to 

time  sharpening  her  sword? 

G.  M. 


CONTENTS 


PREFACE 


I.  GERMANY  AND  FRANCE  i 

I.   THE  PREDICAMENT  OF  GERMANY  I 

II.  THE  POSITION  OF  FRANCE  33 

III.  THE  SOLUTION  42 

II.  THE  EAST  58 

I.   SYRIA,  MESOPOTAMIA,  EGYPT,  AND 

INDIA  58 

II.  AN  EASTERN  POLICY  7O 

III.  RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS  80 

I.   THE  CIVIL  WAR  82 

II.   RUSSIA'S  NEIGHBOURS  QO 

IV.  PRE-WAR  AND  POST- WAR  CAUSES  OF 

STRIFE  98 

I.  ARMAMENTS  IOO 

II.  MARKETS  AND  FOOD  IO7 

V.  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  1 14 

BOOKS  FOR  FURTHER  READING  125 


THE  PROBLEM 

OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

•  • 
• 

CHAPTER  I 
GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

I.  THE  PREDICAMENT  OF  GERMANY 
A  FRIEND  of  mine  was  recently  travelling  in 
Germany  in  a  third-class  railway  carriage.  The 
engine  was  slow  and  in  lack  of  oil.  The  car- 
riages, once  so  clean,  warm,  and  well  lighted, 
were  unlit,  dirty,  and  bitterly  cold.  There  was 
an  air  of  broken  nerves  and  misery  among  the 
passengers,  and  one  woman  was  still  sobbing 
from  some  indignity  offered  to  her  by  a  foreign 
official  in  the  occupied  area.  Presently  an  old 
gentleman,  apparently  a  lawyer  of  some  emi- 
nence, broke  out:  "A  reckoning  must  come.  My 
little  grandchildren  are  drinking  in  revenge 
with  their  mother's  milk.  In  thirty  years 
or  thereabouts  we  shall  settle  accounts  with 
France,  and  then  we  shall  make"  —  he  swept 
the  air  with  his  hand  —  "tabula  rasa!" 

I 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

"Herr  Justizrat,"  answered  a  younger  man, 
"did  you  take  part  in  the  war?  I  think  not  — 
you  would  be  over  the  age.  I  was  in  the  war 
for  four  years.  ...  I  agree  with  you  that,  in  all 
probability,  in  thirty  or  forty  years  we  shall 
settle  our  account  with  France  and  make  ta- 
bula rasa.  And  in  thirty  or  forty  years  after 
that  France  will  have  her  reckoning  with  us 
and  make  tabula  rasa  of  Germany;  and  then  we 
again,  and  so  on.  But,  if  you  will  excuse  me, 
Herr  Justizrat,  I  do  not  find  in  the  prospect  any 
of  the  satisfaction  which  it  appears  to  give 
you." 

An  incident  of  this  sort  may  be  significant  or 
may  not.  It  may  be  typical  or  may  be  excep- 
tional. But  my  friend's  experience  seems  ex- 
actly to  agree  with  the  report  made  by  Herr 
Simons  to  the  Reichstag  in  the  last  week  of 
August,  1920,  upon  the  attitude  of  the  German 
Government  towards  the  war  then  proceeding 
between  Poland  and  Russia.  The  Entente 

.    x' 

Powers  had  invited  Germany  to  take  certain 
unneutral  steps  on  the  side  of  Poland ;  the  Gov- 
ernment had,  as  a  matter  of  course,  refused. 

2 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

The  Soviet  Government  had  also  invited  Ger- 
many to  join  in  the  war  on  their  side,  holding 
out  the  hope  that  such  action  by  Germany 
would  precipitate  a  Bolshevik  revolution  in 
Poland  and  other  parts  of  eastern  Europe  and 
lead  to  an  alliance  capable  of  defying  the  En- 
tente. The  German  Government,  said  Herr 
Simons,  carefully  considered  these  proposals, 
as  it  felt  bound  to  consider  any  possible  pros- 
pect of  escape  for  Germany  from  the  intol- 
erable servitude  imposed  upon  her  by  the 
Peace  of  Versailles,  but  decided  that  it  was 
not  in  the  public  interest  to  accept  them. 

Thus  the  German  Foreign  Minister,  a  man 
respected  by  all  parties,  expresses  in  sober  and 
thoughtful  language  much  the  same  sentiment 
as  the  Justizrat  in  his  passion.  The  Peace  of 
Versailles  has,  like  most  settlements  imposed 
by_conquerors  upon  their  beaten  enemies,  pro- 
duced a  condition  so  intolerable  that  the  van- 
quished must  be  expected  to  seize  the  first  fa- 
vourable opportunity  for  fighting  to  free  them- 
selves. It  has  sown  the  seeds  of  future  war. 

Now,  it  was  the  great  hope  of  English  Liber- 
3 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

als  and  those  who  agreed  with  them,  that,  con- 
trary to  almost  all  precedent,  this  war  might  be 
ended  by  a  peace  so  high-minded  and  states- 
manlike and  far-seeing,  so  scrupulously  fair  to 
the  vanquished  and  so  single-mindedly  set  upon 
the  healing  of  national  wounds  and  the  recon- 
struction of  a  shattered  society,  that  the  ordi- 
nary motives  for  a  war  of  revenge  would  not  ex- 
ist, and  the  nations  might  really  cooperate  with 
one  another  to  save  all  Europe  from  a  common 
ruin.  In  1914  and  1915,  when  war  still  seemed 
to  Englishmen  an  almost  incredible  horror,  and 
it  was  still  necessary  to  appeal  to  men's  con- 
sciences if  we  wished  them  to  fight,  volunteers 
were  invited  for  a  "war  to  end  war."  The 
statesmen  who,  in  those  days,  were  still  the 
leaders  of  the  country,  were  emphatic  in  stating 
that  we  were  not  engaged  in  any  attempt  to 
destroy  or  oppress  the  German  people,  but  only 
"the  military  domination  of  Prussia."  Even 
later,  when  the  Liberal  and  idealist  elements 
in  the  country  withered  in  the  poisonous  air 
or  were  supplanted  by  more  robust  forces,  it 
seemed  as  if  President  Wilson  was  upholding, 

4 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

with  even  greater  insistence  and  emphasis,  the 
banner  of  ultimate  reconciliation  as  the  goal 
of  the  war.  For  the  war  itself  he  prescribed 
"Force,  Force  to  the  utmost,  Force  without 
stint  or  limit,  righteous  and  triumphant  Force, 
which  shall  make  Right  the  Law  of  the  World 
and  cast  every  selfish  dominion  down  in  the 
dust "  (April  6, 1918) ;  but,  as  soon  as  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  were  overthrown,  he  was  for  what  he 
called  "peace  without  victory,"  a  peace  with 
no  element  of  revenge,  "a  new  international 
order  based  upon  broad  and  universal  prin- 
ciples of  right  and  justice"  (February  II,  1918). 
Especial  emphasis  was  laid  on  our  good-will 
towards  the  German  people.  "We  have  no 
quarrel  with  the  German  people.  We  have  no 
feeling  towards  them  but  one  of  sympathy  and 
friendship"  (April  2,  1917).  "They  did  not 
originate  or  desire  this  hideous  war  ...  we  are 
fighting  their  cause,  as  they  will  some  day  see  it, 
as  well  as  our  own"  (Flag  Day,  1917). 

It  is  not  clear  that  this  ideal  was  an  impos- 
sible one.  The  war  of  Prussia  against  Austria 
in  1866  was  unscrupulous  and  aggressive  in  its 

5 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

origin ;  but  Bismarck  meant  it  to  end  in  a  rec- 
onciliation after  victory,  and  so  it  did.  He 
secured  a  peace  which  left  no  sting  of  injustice 
behind  it.  Lincoln  did  not  live  to  make  the 
settlement  with  the  South  after  the  American 
Civil  War;  but  enough  is  known  of  his  inten- 
tions to  make  us  sure  that  he  intended  to  carry 
through  at  all  costs  a  peace  of  reconciliation, 
extremely  different  from  that  which  took  place 
when  he  was  gone.  The  British  war  against  the 
Boers  in  1899-1902,  though  open  to  the  sever- 
est criticism  in  its  origin,  ended  in  a  genuine 
peace  of  reconciliation  in  the  settlement  of  1906, 
for  which  the  reward  came  rapidly  and  in  full 
measure  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War.  Had 
things  been  a  little  different  in  1918,  had  Presi- 
dent Wilson  had  the  same  support  from  his 
own  people  that  he  had  from  the  best  elements 
in  Europe,  had  a  Liberal  or  Labour  Govern- 
ment been  in  power  to  make  a  settlement  of  the 
Great  War  like  the  settlement  which  followed 
the  Boer  War,  had  the  popular  influences  of  the 
time  been  better  guided,  Europe  might  have 
had  a  genuinely  Liberal  peace.  Indeed,  it 

6 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

seemed  at  the  last  moment  almost  certain  that 
a  Liberal  peace  had  been  secured.  In  an  ad- 
dress to  Congress  on  January  8,  1918,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  laid  down  his  memorable  Fourteen 
Points  to  be  observed  in  any  treaty  of  peace 
with  Germany.  The  first  five  may  be  especially 
noted: 

1.  Open  covenants  of  peace  openly  arrived  at, 
after  which  there  shall  be  no  private  international 
understandings  of  any  kind,  but  diplomacy  shall 
always  proceed  frankly  and  in  the  public  view. 

2.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  seas 
outside  territorial  waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war, 
except  as  the  seas  may  be  closed  in  whole  or  in  part 
by  international  action  for  the  enforcement  of  in- 
ternational covenants. 

3.  The  removal  as  far  as  possible  of  all  economic 
barriers,  and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of 
trade  conditions  among  all  nations  consenting  to 
the  peace  and  associating  themselves  for  its  main- 
tenance. 

4.  Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that 
national  armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest 
point  consistent  with  domestic  safety. 

5.  A  free,  open-minded  and  absolutely  impartial 
adjustment  of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict 
observance  of  the  principle  that  in  determining  all 
such  questions  of  sovereignty  the  interests  of  the 
populations  concerned   must  have   equal   weight 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

with  the  equitable  claims  of  the  Government  whose 
title  is  to  be  determined.1 

The  Fourteen  Points  were  not  only  acclaimed 
by  Liberal  opinion  in  England :  they  were  vigor- 
ously circulated  by  our  Government  propa- 
ganda in  Germany  and  Austria,  as  were  all 
other  statements  considered  likely  to  induce 
the  enemy  peoples  to  weaken  or  surrender.  On 
October  5,  1918,  the  German  Republican  Gov- 
ernment proposed  peace  on  the  basis  of  the 
Fourteen  Points.  "They  requested  President 
Wilson  to  take  into  his  hands  the  task  of  es- 
tablishing peace  on  the  basis  of  the  Fourteen 
Points  contained  in  his  message  to  Congress  of 
January  8,  1918,  and  on  the  basis  of  his  subse- 
quent proclamations,  especially  his  speech  of 
September  27,  1918."  Later  on  they  asked  the 

1  The  other  points  were  briefly:  Evacuation  of  Russia: 
restoration  of  Belgium;  of  France;  transference  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine;  territorial  settlement  of  Italy;  autonomy  of  peoples 
of  Austria-Hungary;  settlement  of  Balkan  States;  of  Turkey; 
restoration  of  Poland;  and  lastly  a  League  of  Nations  — 
though  President  Wilson  never  used  that  somewhat  inaccurate 
phrase.  I  should  like  to  acknowledge  here  my  indebtedness 
to  the  admirable  and  convenient  series  of  publications  issued 
by  the  American  Association  for  International  Conciliation, 
407  West  1 1 7th  Street,  New  York. 

8 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

President  to  inquire  if  the  Allied  Governments 
also  agreed  to  them.  In  response  to  his  in- 
quiries the  Allied  Governments  sent  in  to  him 
an  identical  memorandum: 

The  Allied  Governments  have  given  careful  con- 
sideration to  the  correspondence  which  has  passed 
between  the  President  of  the  United  States  and  the 
German  Government.  Subject  to  the  qualifications 
which  follow,  they  declare  their  willingness  to  make 
peace  with  the  Government  of  Germany  on  the 
terms  of  peace  laid  down  in  the  President's  address 
to  Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  and  the  principles 
of  settlement  enunciated  in  his  subsequent  ad- 
dresses. They  must  point  out,  however,  that  what 
is  usually  described  as  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas  is 
open  to  various  interpretations,  some  of  which  they 
could  not  accept.  They  must  therefore  reserve  to 
themselves  complete  freedom  on  this  subject  when 
they  enter  the  Peace  Conference. 

One  further  "qualification "  was  made  by  the 
Allied  Powers:  by  the  "restoration"  of  the 
invaded  territories  they  understood  "that  com- 
pensation would  be  made  by  Germany  for  all 
damage  done  to  the  civilian  population  of  the 
Allies  and  their  property  by  the  aggression  of 
Germany  by  land,  by  sea  and  from  the  air." 

Thus  the  Fourteen  Points  were  converted 
9 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

into  a  solemn  international  agreement.  The 
Allies  agreed  that  the  treaty  of  peace  should 
consist  of  the  application  in  detail  of  that  funda- 
mental document.  On  that  understanding  the 
Germans  laid  down  their  arms  and  surrendered 
their  means  of  defence. 

It  is  always  difficult  in  the  affairs  of  a  demo- 
cratic country  to  determine  the  exact  point 
where  mere  inconsistency  and  laxity  of  thought, 
or  even  mere  lack  of  coordination  between  the 
various  organs  of  government,  merge  into 
something  like  deliberate  perfidy.  It  may  so 
easily  happen  that  one  set  of  individuals  give 
the  promise  and  quite  another  set  act  in  breach 
of  it.  But  an  Englishman  who  wishes  seriously 
to  understand  the  present  international  situa- 
tion must  begin  by  realizing  clearly  that  the 
treaty  imposed  on  the  Germans  at  Versailles, 
after  they  had  surrendered  their  arms,  appears 
to  them  and  to  a  large  number  of  neutral  ob- 
servers as  a  monstrous  breach  of  faith.  It  con- 
travened in  spirit  and  in  detail  much  of  what 
they  understood  by  the  Fourteen  Points.  I 
confess  that,  after  reading  carefully  the  German 

10 


Protest  and  the  Allied  Reply,  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  German  reading  of  President  Wilson's 
terms  was  in  some  points  the  natural  one;  and, 
apart  from  the  treaty  itself,  that  the  action 
taken  against  the  Germans  when  they  were 
disarmed  was  not  consistent  with  the  language 
and  the  pledges  addressed  to  them  while  they 
were  still  in  the  field.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  cer- 
tain of  those  responsible,  or  partly  responsible, 
for  the  negotiations  on  the  Entente  side,  when 
they  saw  the  way  things  were  going,  recalled 
bitterly  the  great  historic  perfidy  by  which 
Rome  trapped  Carthage  to  her  doom. 

A  charge  of  this  kind  is,  of  course,  very  seri- 
ous ;  and  the  results  of  the  action  taken  at  Ver- 
sailles have  been  more  than  serious.  I  will  ask 
my  readers  patiently  to  consider  in  broad  out- 
lines the  causes,  psychological  and  other,  which 
seem  to  have  been  at  work;  for  of  course  it  is 
quite  possible  and  even  probable  that,  of  the 
main  actors  concerned,  not  one  had  any  in- 
tention of  trying  to  trap  the  Germans  by  per- 
jury. Some  of  them  doubtless  were  unscrupu- 
lous men,  such  as  wars  habitually  throw  to  the 

II 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

surface;  but  they  were  not  men  of  the  Mach- 
iavellian type. 

Two  broad  facts  stand  out  clearly  to  one 
who  studies  the  documents.  First,  the  Gov- 
ernments which  accepted  President  Wilson's 
Fourteen  Points  as  the  basis  of  peace  with  Ger- 
many were  from  the  start  quite  out  of  sym- 
pathy with  his  spirit.  Why,  then,  did  they  ac- 
cept them?  Because  they  had  really  no  choice. 
To  refuse  would  not  have  been  only  to  reject  a 
long  delayed  and  desperately  needed  peace.  It 
would  have  been  to  confess  to  the  world  that, 
contrary  to  so  many  previous  professions, 
their  aims  were  frankly  what  is  now  termed 
"imperialistic."  Above  all,  it  would  have  been 
to  alienate  Mr.  Wilson,  without  whom  victory 
was  impossible.  They  were  bound  to  accept. 

But  Mr.  Wilson's  language  was  often  rather 
lacking  in  definiteness.  Who  knows  exactly 
what  "justice"  is,  or  what  may  be  regarded  as 
consideration  for  "the  true  interests"  of  the 
German  people?  They  accepted  the  terms;  but 
they  were  free  to  use  all  permissible  ingenuity 
in  interpreting  a  document  which  they  had  not 

12 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

drawn  up,  and  which  had  been  forced  upon 
them  in  a  time  of  need. 

Furthermore,  one  who  labours  through  the 
four  hundred  and  forty  articles  of  the  treaty, 
with  their  innumerable  subdivisions,  will  find 
not  merely  that  the  treaty  represents  broadly 
the  victory  of  the  right  side  over  the  wrong, 
and  is  a  charter  of  emancipation  to  large  parts 
of  Europe.  He  will  find  also  that  four  hundred 
or  more  of  the  detailed  articles  are  reasonable 
enough  and  many  of  them  excellent.  The  in- 
justice arises  in  two  ways.  First,  that  on  every 
doubtful  point,  and  there  are  many,  the  deci- 
sion is  apt  to  be  given  against  the  enemy;  and 
next,  that  behind  the  respectable  structure  of 
the  treaty  there  existed  in  fact  a  flood  of  white- 
hot  war-passion  —  revenge,  hate,  terror,  sus- 
picion, and  raging  covetousness  —  which  poi- 
soned the  atmosphere  and  here  and  there  made 
a  breach  in  the  protecting  wall. 

A  great  English  military  critic  somewhat 

shocked  public  opinion  by  saying  at  the  time 

of  the  armistice,  "This  armistice  is  wrong.  We 

have  got  them  down,  and  now  we  ought  to  kick 

13 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

them  till  we  have  had  enough."  The  French, 
he  said,  ought  to  have  continued  the  war  and 
marched  on  to  Berlin,  plundering  and  ravaging 
till  they  had  satisfied  their  revenge.  The  words 
sound  like  insanity*  but  the  speaker  explained 
them  later  on.  A  war  of  revenge,  he  argued,  is 
within  the  limits  of  pardonable  human  nature. 
And  it  comes  to  an  end.  But,  being  cheated  of 
their  decisive  campaign  of  victory,  the  French 
were  making  a  peace  of  revenge;  and  that  is  a 
thing  which  is  apt  to  admit  of  no  forgiveness 
and  no  finish. 

I  quote  these  words  not  because  I  agree  with 
them  in  practical  policy,  but  because  of  the' pro- 
found psychological  truth  that  they  express. 
Behind  the  statesmen  who  had  pledged  their 
words,  however  unwillingly,  remained  masses 
of  ignorant,  violent,  and  war-maddened  people, 
many  of  them  with  terrible  wrongs  to  avenge 
and  no  guide  or  leader  to  help  them  against 
themselves.  We  need  not  recall,  though  few 
sensitive  people  will  ever  forget,  the  horrors  of 
the  propaganda  of  hate.  It  is  only  worth  realiz- 
ing that  the  mob-inspired  journalists  and  jour- 

14 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

nalist-inspired  mobs  who  clamoured  for  an 
utter  and  all-devouring  peace  of  revenge,  in- 
cluding the  starvation  and  enslavement  of 
half  Europe  for  thirty  or  fifty  or  a  hundred 
years,  had  never  themselves  signed  the  Four- 
teen Points  and  felt  no  personal  inconsistency 
or  turpitude  if  they  compelled  the  Supreme 
Council  of  the  Allies  to  break  its  faith. 
^The  first  step  in  this  policy  lay  outside  the 
treaty.  The  third  of  the  Fourteen  Points  es- 
tablished "equality  of  trade  conditions"  and 
the  "removal  of  economic  barriers"  between  all 
the  nations  consenting  to  the  peace.  Immedi- 
ately after  the  armistice  a  proposal  was  made, 
and  met  with  strong  American  support,  that 
the  Allies  should  set  themselves  at  once  to  at- 
tempting to  cope  with  the  threatened  famine 
and  the  lack  of  raw  materials  in  Central  Eu- 
rope, and  thus  get  European  trade  on  its  legs 
again  as  early  as  possible.  This  would  relieve 
a  vast  amount  of  distress,  serve  as  a  stepping- 
stone  to  reconciliation,  save  many  nations  from 
the  danger  of  irremediable  collapse,  and  also 
make  far  more  possible  the  restoration  of  the 
15 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

invaded  areas  and  the  payment  of  large  repara- 
tions by  Germany.  It  was  proposed  to  follow 
the  analogy  of  the  peace  of  1871 ;  to  draw  up  a 
preliminary  peace  agreement,  stating  principles 
and  limits  but  not  details.  For  example,  it 
might  be  agreed  that  Germany  must  surrender 
some  territory  in  the  West  and  in  Poland,  but 
not  beyond  certain  geographical  lines;  must 
pay  an  indemnity  to  be  fixed  on  certain  princi- 
ples, but  not  to  exceed  a  certain  sum,  and  the 
like.  The  territorial  agreement,  again,  might 
be  based  on  the  elaborate  statement  of  war  aims 
issued  by  the  British  Government  on  January 
10,  1917.  The  Germans  could  have  accepted 
this,  and  the  work  of  reconstruction  been  be- 
gun immediately.  Incalculable  distress  and 
suffering  would  thus  have  been  saved. 

But  another  view  prevailed.  With  the  short- 
sightedness that  so  often  accompanies  brutal- 
ity, the  German  High  Command  had,  in  the 
very  last  months  of  the  war,  when  their  defeat 
was  certain,  tried  systematically  to  cripple  the 
industry  of  Belgium  and  France  by  destroying 
mines,  breaking  machinery,  carrying  off  mov- 

16 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

able  plant,  and  the  like.  Their  own  manufac- 
turing plant  was  undamaged,  and  they  indulged 
in  the  fatuous  expectation  that  they  might  re- 
capture their  lost  markets  and  spring  into  pros- 
perity, while  France  and  Belgium  were  still  too 
crippled  to  commence  work.  Of  course,  this 
could  not  be  allowed.  The  obvious  alternatives, 
such  as  allocating  certain  German  factories  to 
French  or  Belgian  companies  whose  plant  had 
been  destroyed,  or  simply  allocating  the  profits 
to  purposes  of  reparation,  appear  not  to  have 
been  considered.  The  blinder  motives  were  too 
strong,  and  no  statesman  arose  to  give  guidance. 
All  Germany  must  be  punished.  She  had  not 
been  invaded  and  ravaged.  She  must  be  made 
to  suffer  the  pains  of  invasion.  She  must  be 
ravaged  in  cold  blood.  The  complete  ruin  of 
Germany,  argued  certain  French  journalists 
and  politicians,  was  demanded  by  all  considera- 
tions both  of  justice  and  of  safety,  and  it  had 
not  by  any  means  been  attained.  Russia  was 
paralyzed  and  wrecked  by  Bolshevism.  But 
the  German  Revolution  had  been  carried  suc- 
cessfully through.  The  people  were  not  yet  de- 

17 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

moralized,  and  the  problem  was  how  to  de- 
moralize them.  Perhaps  starvation  would  do  it. 
Hence  was  started  the  policy  of  deliberately 
ruining  Germany,  after  her  surrender,  by  a  long 
blockade  in  time  of  what,  to  the  ordinary  man, 
appeared  to  be  peace,  and  immediately  after  a 
promise  of  "the  removal  of  economic  barriers 
and  the  establishment  of  equality  of  trade  con- 
ditions." This  was  not  a  technical  breach  of 
faith;  technically  we  were  still  at  war  with  Ger- 
many, and  we  had  never  promised  not  to  starve 
our  enemies  after  their  surrender.  The  promise 
of  equality  of  trade  conditions  only  applied  to 
conditions  after  the  peace.  Nevertheless,  a  his- 
torian will  probably  regard  the  establishment 
and  continuance  of  this  blockade  of  the  enemy 
lands  after  their  surrender  as  one  of  those  many 
acts  of  almost  incredible  inhumanity  which  have 
made  the  recent  Great  War  conspicuous  in  the 
annals  of  mankind  and  shaken  thoughtful  men's 
faith  in  the  reality  of  modern  civilization.  Cer- 
tain articles  in  the  Matin  discussing  the  exact 
dose  of  famine  desirable  in  order  to  create  the 
maximum  of  individual  suffering  and  public 

18 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

weakness  in  the  Boche  are  difficult  to  parallel 
in  the  literature  of  morbid  hate,  except  among 
some  of  the  German  war  pamphlets. 

Thus  the  Fourteen  Points,  besides  a  regret- 
table indefiniteness  of  phrasing,  had  the  fatal 
fault  of  being  utterly  out  of  touch  with  the  feel- 
ing of  most  of  the  belligerents.  As  the  time 
wore  on  this  feeling  asserted  its  influence  on 
the  terms  of  the  treaty.  The  Boche  had  delib- 
erately and  treacherously  plunged  Europe  into 
war;  he  had  waged  the  war  with  revolting  cru- 
elty; he  had  inflicted  unheard-of  suffering  on 
the  innocent,  and,  by  a  miracle,  he  had  been 
beaten.  Now  let  him  pay  the  penalty!  Presi- 
dent Wilson  had  pledged  the  Allies  "to  be  just 
to  the  German  people  as  to  all  others.  ...  To 
propose  anything  but  justice  to  Germany  at 
any  time  would  be  to  renounce  our  own  cause." 
"Very  good,"  answered  the  dominant  voices  of 
1918;  "the  criminal  asks  for  justice,  and  so  far 
as  our  power  reaches,  justice  he  shall  have!" 
The  total  of  wrongs  done  by  Germany,  in  plot- 
ting the  war,  in  waging  it,  and  in  the  de- 
struction of  life  and  property,  could  easily  be 
19 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

regarded  as  an  almost  infinite  sum,  and  "Jus- 
tice" surely  demanded  for  that  an  almost  in- 
finite punishment. 

The  first  concession  to  this  insistent  pressure 
was  on  a  point  of  form.  The  language  of  the 
Fourteen  Points  and  the  accompanying  docu- 
ments implied  that  the  treaty  would  be  a  mat- 
ter of  discussion  and  negotiation.  The  basis 
was  agreed  upon ;  it  seemed  natural  to  suppose 
that  the  next  step  was  to  negotiate.  But  popu- 
lar feeling  had  caught  at  the  phrase  "uncondi- 
tional surrender";  and,  though  nothing  could 
be  clearer  than  the  fact  that  the  German  army 
had  surrendered  on  perfectly  explicit  condi- 
tions, signed  and  agreed  to  by  every  Govern- 
ment concerned,  it  was  decided  that  terms 
were  not  to  be  negotiated  but  "imposed."  Mr. 
Keynes  has  shown  in  an  interesting  way  how 
great  was  the  effect  of  this  decision.  Terms 
were  drawn  up  with  a  view  to  bargaining,  leav- 
ing a  margin  for  possible  concessions;  and  then 
there  was  no  bargaining.  The  whole  demand 
was  suddenly  enforced. 

Questions  of  territory  outside  Europe  were 
20 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

decided  purely  by  conquest.  Immense  areas  in 
Asia  and  Africa  were  seized  as  spoil  by  the 
strongest  Powers,  though  the  conditions  of 
their  tenure  were,  so  it  was  hoped,  to  be  regu- 
lated by  the  League  of  Nations.  In  some  cases 
there  was  a  pretence  of  consulting  the  wishes  of 
the  inhabitants;  in  most  cases  this  was  not 
practicable.  In  Syria  and  South  Tyrol  the 
wishes  of  the  inhabitants  were  notoriously 
overridden.  In  Europe  as  a  whole,  however, 
the  decisions  were  made  on  Wilsonian  princi- 
ples. True,  they  told  heavily  against  Germany. 
But  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  Germans  and 
German  Austrians,  by  reason  of  their  great 
strength  and  high  organizing  power,  had  an 
imperial  position  in  Europe,  and  any  liberation 
of  subject  or  quasi-subject  nationalities  was 
bound  to  be  at  the  expense  of  the  Germans. 
The  territorial  settlement,  in  spite  of  the  great 
and  needless  distress  produced  by  the  break-up 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  system,  is  on  princi- 
ples of  nationality  juster  than  that  which  pre- 
ceded it.  The  more  extreme  anti-German 
claims  were  successfully  resisted.  France  was 

21 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

not  allowed  to  annex  Germany  up  to  the  Elbe, 
as  M.  Hanotaux  wished;  nor  even  up  to  the 
Rhine.  No  partition  of  Germany  by  force  was 
permitted,  though  an  agitation  for  that  purpose 
still  continues  in  France  and  the  prohibition  of 
any  future  union  between  German-Austria  and 
the  rest  of  Germany  was  actually  embodied  in 
the  treaty.  The  treaty  of  Berlin  had  in  just  the 
same  way  attempted  to  forbid  the  unity  of  Bul- 
garia. 

As  regards  the  penal  clauses,  it  may  be  con- 
vincingly argued  that  the  great  crimes  and 
cruelties  and  breaches  of  law  which  have  sig- 
nalized this  war  ought  emphatically  to  meet 
with  judgment  and  punishment  from  some 
tribunal  representing  the  conscience  of  civilized 
mankind.  On  grounds  of  justice  the  presence 
of  such  penal  clauses  in  the  treaty  could  be  am- 
ply justified,  though  considerations  of  policy 
make  it  more  questionable.  But  all  thoughts 
of  equal  justice  disappeared  in  derision  when  it 
was  found  that  only  crimes  committed  by  the 
enemies  of  the  Entente  were  to  be  punished; 
crimes  committed  by  British,  French,  Italian, 

22 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

Serbian  or  American  criminals  were  privileged 
acts,  to  which  "Justice"  had  nothing  to  say. 

This  absurd  clause  has,  of  course,  given  rise 
to  suspicions,  more  absurd  than  itself,  of  dark 
crimes  committed  by  Entente  generals  which 
must  be  concealed  at  any  cost.  Such  sugges- 
tions are  nonsense.  Indefensible  as  it  is,  the 
clause  was  dictated  by  no  more  sinister  passion 
than  ordinary  national  vanity.  The  economic 
clauses  were  open  to  graver  suspicions.  It  was 
whispered  that  trade  interests  of  not  quite 
unimpeachable  character  had  some  influence 
with  members  of  the  French,  the  Italian,  and 
even  the  English  Government;  and  the  old 
German  accusation  that  England  entered  the 
war  in  order  to  destroy  a  trade  rival,  utterly 
untrue  at  the  time,  seemed  to  receive  some  col- 
our by  the  terms  of  peace.  Germany  depended 
for  her  prosperity  on  her  industry  and  her  over- 
seas trade.  Her  industry  was  wrecked  by  an 
immense  demand  upon  her  coal.  The  mines  of 
Lorraine,  the  Saar  Valley,  and,  subject  to  plebi- 
scite, of  Silesia,  were  handed  over  to  other 
states;  and  out  of  the  remainder  Germany  was 
23 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

condemned  to  pay  an  amount  of  coal  which 
proved,  on  investigation  at  Spa,  two  years 
later,  to  be  beyond  her  powers.  Her  overseas 
trade  was  annihilated  at  a  blow  by  the  seizure 
of  all  the  vessels  of  her  mercantile  marine  ex- 
ceeding 1600  tons  gross  and  a  large  proportion 
of  her  small  vessels  and  fishing-boats,  com- 
bined with  a  demand  upon  such  ships  as  she 
might  build  in  future.  Her  voice  was  stifled  by 
the  seizure  of  all  her  telegraphic  cables:  news 
henceforth  was  to  be  a  monopoly  of  the  con- 
querors. At  the  same  time  all  her  colonies 
were  taken  from  her.  She  was  forbidden  to  set 
up  any  tariffs  for  her  own  protection.  Her 
navigable  rivers  were  put  under  the  control  of 
international  commissions  on  which  the  Ger- 
mans or  Austrians  were  a  small  minority.  And 
while  it  was  somewhat  unctuously  explained  to 
Germany  that  in  a  virtuous  world  trade  would 
be  free  and  untrammelled,  and  that  the  com- 
missions only  intended  to  see  that  she  did  not 
erect  barriers  against  her  innocent  neighbours, 
there  was  no  provision  whatever  made  to  debar 
the  Allies  from  erecting  what  barriers  they 
24 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

pleased  against  Germany.  "It  would  appear 
to  be  a  fundamental  fallacy,"  declared  the  Al- 
lied Reply,  "that  the  political  control  of  a 
country  is  essential  in  order  to  procure  a  rea- 
sonable share  of  its  products.  Such  a  proposal 
finds  no  foundation  in  economic  law  or  his- 
tory." It  has  found  some  foundation  in  history 
since. 

The  triumph  of  penal  ingenuity,  however, 
waathe  indefinite  indemnity.  It  was  agreed  on 
both  sides  that  Germany  was  to  pay  an  indem- 
nity. She  did  not  demur.  Indeed,  her  mouth 
was  closed  by  the  monstrously  oppressive  and 
inhuman  proposals  various  Germans  had  them- 
selves put  forward  when  they  expected  to  win 
the  war.  She  had  openly  intended  to  "bleed 
France  and  England  white."  Now  that  she 
was  beaten  she  was  prepared  to  pay.  She  ac- 
cepted the  duty  of  "restoring"  the  invaded 
territories.  This  was  defined  as  "reparation 
for  all  damage  done  to  the  civil  population  of 
the  Allies  by  German  aggression."  The  Ger- 
mans probably  understood  this  to  mean  the 
damage  done  to  civilian  life  and  property  by 
25 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

invasions  or  raids;  but  they  were  told  that 
this  view  was  too  narrow.  Every  soldier  killed 
or  wounded  had  civilians  dependent  on  him; 
nay,  he  himself  was  really  a  civilian  forced  by 
German  aggression  to  desert  his  business.  All 
his  business  losses,  the  separation  allowances 
to  his  wife,  the  pensions  to  ex-soldiers  or  to 
their  dependents,  all  damage  to  any  one's 
"health  or  honour,"  were  ultimately  "due  to 
German  aggression"  and  should  be  paid  by 
Germany.  No  such  terms  had  ever  been  heard 
of  before,  true;  but  the  British  electors  had 
been  promised  that  "Germany  should  pay  the 
whole  cost  of  the  war";  and  the  sense  of  the 
solemn  contract  was  distorted  to  suit  the  elec- 
tion cry.  After  1871  the  Germans  had  imposed 
on  France  what  was  then  considered  the  ex- 
tremely severe  indemnity  of  two  hundred  mil- 
lion pounds  sterling.  Some  experts  now  pro- 
posed two  thousand  million  sterling  as  an  ade- 
quate indemnity  to  be  paid  by  Germany,  others 
three  thousand  million.  That  was  emended  by 
popular  orators  to  ten  thousand  million ;  thirty 
thousand  million;  fifty  thousand  million.  Ab- 

26 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

surd  to  say  that  Germany  could  not  pay!  If  all 
German  property  were  confiscated  and  all  Ger- 
mans for  seventy-five  years  were  made  to  work 
for  the  Allies  at  a  bare  subsistence  wage,  a  well- 
known  English  public  man  was  prepared  to  get 
more  than  fifty  thousand  million  out  of  them. 
The  Americans  bluntly  refused  to  endorse 
demands  which  they  considered  extortionate. 
The  indemnity  was  left  unspecified.  It  should 
depend  on  Germany's  capacity  to  pay.  Let  the 
Germans  get  to  work  at  once  and  do  their  best. 
The  more  they  produced,  the  more  the  Allies 
would  take ;  and  if,  after  two  years  or  so,  it  be- 
came necessary  to  fix  the  sum,  the  less  the  Ger- 
mans had  produced  in  those  two  years  the  less 
they  would  eventually  have  to  pay.  It  is  said 
that  some  of  the  British  Ministers,  secretly 
anxious  to  be  more  reasonable  than  was  con- 
sistent with  popularity  at  the  moment,  wished 
to  postpone  the  fixing  of  the  indemnity  until 
the  rage  of  their  own  "Khaki  Election"  should 
have  cooled  down.  But  their  calculation  was  a 
bad  one.  As  the  German  delegation  observed: 
"The  German  people  would  feel  themselves 
27 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

condemned  to  slavery,  because  everything 
they  accomplished  would  benefit  neither  them- 
selves nor  even  their  children,  but  merely 
strangers.  But  the  system  of  slave  labour  has 
never  been  successful." 

For  the  purpose  of  raising  money  the  proposal 
was  merely  fatuous.  It  took  away  from  the 
Germans  every  possible  motive  for  producing 
wealth.  But  its  object  in  some  minds  was  not 
money;  its  object  was  the  permanent  ruin  of 
Germany.  It  was  feared  in  France  that,  though 
the  Germans  were  now  exhausted  and  beggared, 
their  notorious  industry  and  ingenuity  might 
in  time  enable  them  to  pay  off  their  indemnity 
and  rise  again  to  affluence  and  strength.  So 
it  was  arranged  that,  for  some  years  at  least, 
they  should  be  deprived  of  every  motive  for 
industry. 

Lastly,  a  new  provision  was  made  about 
private  property.  The  rule  hitherto  observed 
in  the  land  wars  of  civilized  states  was  that 
enemy  private  property  was  respected,  and  if 
seized  during  the  war  was  restored  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace.  This  rule  was,  of  course,  enforced 

28 


in  favour  of  any  property  belonging  to  nationals 
of  the  Entente  countries  situated  in  enemy 
lands;  but  reciprocity  was  not  admitted.  The 
private  property  of  any  German  situate  in  any 
part  of  the  world  which  was  under  the  control 
of  the  Ententes  was  ipso  facto  confiscated.  ' '  The 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers  reserve  the  right 
to  retain  and  liquidate  all"  such  property. 
Every  German,  however  innocent,  who  had 
settled  in  our  territory  before  the  war  was  thus 
exposed  to  be  robbed  of  everything  he  possessed. 
Nay,  it  seems  almost  incredible,  but  in  the  origi- 
nal form  of  the  treaty  which  was  put  before  the 
enemy  for  signature  the  stipulation  seems  ac- 
tually to  have  been  laid  down  that  any  prop- 
erty which  a  German  might  hereafter  make  or 
acquire  in  Entente  territory  should  be  liable  to 
confiscation  at  the  will  of  the  Entente  Govern- 
ments !  This  clause  was  too  much  even  for  the 
atmosphere  of  Versailles,  and  in  response  to 
the  German  protest  the  stipulation  about  the 
future  was  dropped.1  For  the  rest  of  the  confis- 

1  See  Keynes,  pp.  60-102.   A  provision  was  kept  enabling 
all  such  private  property  to  be  confiscated  in  case  the  German 

29 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

cation,  the  Entente  Reply  brazens  it  out  with 
the  remark  that  the  property  is  not  really  taken 
from  the  individual,  as  his  own  Government 
can  always  pay  him  back!  And  in  case  the  pri- 
vate property  of  Germans  in  neutral  countries 
should  have  an  unfair  advantage,  the  Repara- 
tion Commission  obtained  special  powers  for 
confiscating  that  too,  up  to  the  limit  of  £100,- 
000,000. 

We  need  not  stop  to  consider  whether  there 
was  any  extraordinary  exhibition  of  "Teutonic 
insolence"  in  the  action  of  certain  German  offi- 
cials who  resigned  their  offices  rather  than  sign 
this  treaty;  nor  need  we  swell  the  chorus  of  Eng- 
lish, French,  Italian,  and  American  newspapers 
in  expressing  the  natural  horror  of  those  re- 
fined nations  at  the  bad  manners  of  Count 
Brockdorf-Rantzau  in  actually  breaking  a 
paper-knife  in  the  stress  of  his  emotion,  when, 
under  protest,  he  consented  to  sign.  There  was 
one  man  among  the  British  representatives  who 

Government  should  "voluntarily  fail"  to  fulfil  its  engage- 
ments. But  this  also  was  dropped  by  the  British  Government 
in  October,  1920. 

30 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

had  known  what  it  was  to  be  conquered  after 
a  desperate  war.  General  Smuts  was  a  man  of 
imagination  as  well  as  a  soldier  and  a  states- 
man. He  hesitated  long  before  signing  the 
treaty;  and  when,  in  the  end,  he  decided  that 
it  was  necessary  to  do  so,  he  immediately  pub- 
lished a  statement  of  protest.  "I  have  signed 
the  peace  treaty,  not  because  I  consider  it  a 
satisfactory  document,  but  because  it  is  im- 
peratively necessary  to  close  the  war.  .  .  .  The 
six  months  since  the  armistice  was  signed  have 
perhaps  been  as  upsetting,  unsettling,  and 
ruinous  to  Europe  as  the  previous  four  years  of 
war.  I  look  upon  the  peace  treaty  as  the  close 
of  those  two  chapters  of  war  and  armistice,  and 
only  on  that  ground  do  I  sign  it."  Liberal 
opinion  in  England  muttered  assent.  Some  im- 
portant officials  resigned.  But  the  fear  of  up- 
setting peace  altogether  prevented  any  open 
protest  in  Parliament.  We  need  not  lose  our- 
selves in  speculations  as  to  the  strange  devices 
to  which  public  men  can  sink  when  their  self- 
interest  is  clear  and  their  responsibility  can  be 
denied  or  evaded;  nor  yet  as  to  the  infinite 
31 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ramifications  by  which  war  spreads  its  poison 
through  human  society,  a  thing  twice-cursed, 
cursing  him  that  strikes  and  him  that  suffers. 
The  old  German  Government  had  committed 
a  vast  crime  against  humanity;  its  people  had 
backed  it  up,  as  all  European  peoples  back  up 
their  own  Governments,  and  could  not  expect 
to  escape  heavy  punishment.  The  one  question 
we  need  ask  ourselves  is  this:  Is  it  not  as  cer- 
tain, as  anything  in  human  nature  can  be,  that 
a  treaty  of  such  a  character,  imposed  on  a  con- 
quered nation  by  force,  if  not  also  by  treachery, 
will,  as  a  matter  of  course  and  without  the 
faintest  scruple,  be  broken  as  soon  as  there  is 
a  favourable  opportunity  for  breaking  it?  Of 
course  the  Germans  will  break  it  if  they  can; 
and  of  course  they  will  make  another  war,  call 
it  a  war  of  revenge  or  a  war  for  freedom  as  you 
please,  as  soon  as  there  is  any  chance  of  win- 
ning it. 

So  said  the  Justizrat  in  the  train.  So,  in  ef- 
fect, says  Herr  Simons;  so  almost  ad  nauseam 
repeat  all  the  German  Conservative  and  patri- 
otic newspapers.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  any 

32 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

German  who  is  not  a  convinced  pacifist  should 
do  otherwise  than  prepare  with  all  his  energies 
for  the  next  war,  unless  some  other  way  is  made 
possible  of  escape  from  a  tormenting  servitude. 

II.  THE  POSITION  OF  FRANCE 
IF  that  is  so,  what  is  the  position  of  France? 
France  in  1914  was  forced  into  a  war  which  she 
tried  hard  to  avoid.  The  French  suffered  hor- 
ribly and  fought  heroically.  They  sacrificed 
everything  to  the  war.  And  we,  who  know 
what  our  own  people  paid  in  broken  nerve,  in 
bitterness,  and  in  economic  dislocation,  cannot 
be  surprised  that  France  has  paid  a  heavier 
price.  They  escaped  defeat  by  the  help  of  Eng- 
land, Russia,  Italy,  and  America;  without  these 
powerful  allies  they  would  certainly  have  been 
defeated.  We  need  not  try  to  estimate  exactly 
what  their  fate  would  have  been  if  they  had 
lost  the  late  war,  because  if  they  lose  the  next 
their  treatment  will  be  infinitely  worse.  It  will 
be,  as  far  as  possible,  tabula  rasa.  It  will  be  the 
passing  of  the  horse-hoofs  of  Attila.  Meantime 
France's  allies  are,  naturally  enough,  going 
33 


home  and  attending  to  their  own  businesses; 
her  population  is  much  smaller  than  Germany's 
and  increases  even  more  slowly. 
r  A  French  statesman  of  the  type  of  M.  Poin- 
careor  M.  Hanotaux  makes  himself  no  illusions. 
Germany  is  the  enemy.  Germany  will  fight 
again  as  soon  as  she  is  strong  enough.  There- 
fore she  must  never  be  allowed  to  become  strong 
enough.  M.  Hanotaux,  who  was  Foreign  Minis- 
ter during  the  years  1894-98,  when  French 
foreign  policy  was  more  ably  managed  than 
now,  has  recently  published  a  book  in  criticism 
of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  He  does  not  deal 
in  any  Wilsonian  phrases  about  justice  or  hu- 
manity; he  considers  the  treaty  solely  with  a 
view  to  the  security  of  France,  and  he  finds  it 
sadly  wanting.  And  a  large  mass  of  opinion, 
probably  the  prevailing  opinion,  in  France  sup- 
ports him. 

r  First  of  all,  it  must  be  remembered,  France 
wanted,  and  thought  she  had  received,  a  special 
guarantee  against  future  German  attacks  in 
the  form  of  a  defensive  Alliance  between  France, 
England,  and  America.  The  representatives  at 

34 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

Paris  had  agreed  to  this  treaty,  which  definitely 
pledged  England  and  America  to  come  again 
to  the  help  of  France  in  case  of  another  unpro- 
voked attack  by  Germany.  The  English  Par- 
liament, amid  some  protests,  ratified  the  treaty, 
but  the  United  States  Senate  threw  it  out,  and 
therewith  the  treaty  ceased  to  be  binding  on 
England. 

I  think,  after  considerable  hesitation,  that 
the  rejection  of  the  treaty  was  a  misfortune. 
Formally,  no  doubt,  it  was  open  to  objection. 
It  seemed  like  an  unnecessary  excrescence 
upon  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
which  already  gave  guarantees  against  war.  It 
contravened  one  of  Mr.  Wilson's  principles, 
and  a  very  sound  one,  laid  down  on  September 
27,  1918:  "Thirdly,  there  can  be  no  leagues  or 
alliances  or  special  covenants  and  understand- 
ings within  the  general  and  common  family  of 
the  League  of  Nations."  Yet  the  practical  im- 
portance of  reassuring  France  was  so  urgent 
that  a  little  formal  incorrectness  might  have 
been  worth  incurring;  and  even  formal  incor- 
rectness could  have  been  avoided  by  the  simple 
35 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

expedient  of  making  this  guarantee  to  France 
take  the  form  of  a  special  rider  to  Article  XVI 
of  the  Covenant. 

That  article  provides:  "Should  any  member 
of  the  League  resort  to  war  in  disregard  of  its 
covenants  under  Articles  XII,  XIII,  or  XV,  it 
shall  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  committed 
an  act  of  war  against  all  other  members  of  the 
League,  which  hereby  undertake  immediately 
to ..."  To  do  what?  One  expects  that  they 
will  undertake  to  declare  war,  and  this  is  what 
the  French  wanted.  But  no.  They  only  under- 
take to  apply  an  economic  boycott  to  the  of- 
fending state,  while  the  Council  may  "recom- 
mend to  the  several  Governments  concerned 
what  effective  military,  naval,  or  air  force  they 
shall  severally  contribute  to  the  armed  forces 
to  be  used  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the 
League."  In  case  of  a  future  attack  by  Ger- 
many on  France,  France's  late  allies  are  bound 
to  boycott  German  trade,  but  are  not  explicitly 
bound  to  give  military  help  to  France.  I  sug- 
gest that  it  would  have  been  possible  for  Great 
Britain  and  America  to  add  a  rider  stating  spe- 
36 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

cifically  that  in  one  of  the  cases  contemplated 
by  this  article,  namely,  an  unprovoked  attack 
on  France  by  Germany,  they  would  not  merely 
proclaim  a  blockade  and  consider  what  to  do 
next,  but  would  immediately  and  uncondi- 
tionally declare  war.  Such  an  undertaking 
would  involve  some  risk  and  be  contrary  to  our 
usual  policy;  but  I  am  inclined  to  suggest  that 
the  risk  would  have  been  worth  taking. 

However,  this  was  not  done.  France  was 
left  with  the  impression  that  if  attacked  she 
could  not  count  with  confidence  on  the  military 
support  of  her  late  allies  or  of  the  other  Powers 
of  the  League.  The  result  was  disastrous.  While 
the  rest  of  Europe,  supported  by  a  small  but 
generous  and  brilliant  band  of  French  radicals 
and  Socialists,  considered  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles intolerably  harsh,  the  dominant  French 
policy  complained  that  it  was  inadequate  for 
her  protection.  The  line  of  criticism  was  some- 
what as  follows: 

I.  Germany  should  have  been  broken  up. 
No  peace  should  have  been  made  with  Ger- 
many as  a  whole,  but  separate  treaties  of  peace 
37 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

with  Saxony,  Bavaria,  Westphalia,  Prussia, 
etc.  These  states  should  have  been  provided 
with  separate  systems  of  coinage,  postage,  tar- 
iffs, laws,  etc.,  so  as  to  make  the  diversity  stable 
and  permanent.  They  should  be  forbidden 
ever  to  unite.  Also,  France  should  have  an- 
nexed a  large  part  of  Germany;  not  up  to  the 
Rhine  —  which  was  the  view  of  Marshal  Foch 
—  but  up  to  the  Elbe.  The  occupation  of  this 
territory  might  impose  a  burden  on  France, 
but  burdens  must  be  borne  when  such  impor- 
tant purposes  are  involved.  And  after  all  the 
cost  could  be  charged  to  the  Germans ! . . . 

As  this  simple  precaution  was  not  taken,  the 
next  best  thing  is  to  keep  Germany  weak. 
Starve  her  by  the  blockade  till  sheer  misery 
produces  a  Bolshevik  revolution  and  society 
collapses  in  common  ruin.  Then  apply  the 
indefinite  indemnity,  not  from  the  desire  to 
get  money,  but  to  prevent  Germany  again 
raising  her  head. 

2.  Since  France's  late  allies  cannot  be  relied 
upon,  she  must  make  by  diplomacy  new  allies 
whose  hands  she  can  force,  and  who  occupy  a 

38 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

convenient  geographical  situation.  Poland  is 
in  just  the  right  place.  Let  France  help  Poland 
and  stimulate  Polish  ambitions.  She  too  is  a 
nation  maddened  by  suffering  and  now  dazzled 
by  success.  A  great  imperialist  Poland,  on  bad 
terms  with  her  neighbours,  but  backed  by 
France,  will  need  a  large  and  effective  army, 
and  will  be  ready  to  strike  at  Germany's  rear 
the  moment  she  attempts  to  move  westward. 
Unfortunately,  Poland  is  apt  to  be  on  bad 
terms  with  Russia ;  and  as  things  now  are  Rus- 
sia is  so  much  the  enemy  of  the  Entente  that 
she  is  thrown  into  the  arms  of  Germany.  That 
is  deplorable  and  must  not  be  allowed  to  con- 
tinue. The  Bolsheviks  must  be  overthrown 
and  a  Government  set  up  in  Russia  which  is 
dependent  for  its  existence  on  French  support. 
As  an  additional  safeguard,  perhaps  it  will  be 
necessary  to  secure  a  pro-French  Hungary,  to 
back  up  the  pro- French  Poland.  But  we  must 
not  despair  yet  of  overthrowing  the  Bolsheviks. 
3.  Lastly,  France  herself  needs  more  soldiers. 
And  she  knows  where  to  get  them!  The  late 
King  Leopold  of  Belgium  once  said  to  M.  Hano- 
39 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

taux,  "Qu'est-ce  que  vous  cherchez  en  Afrique, 
vous  autres  Frangais?"  and  M.  Hanotaux  re- 
plied, "Sire,  des  soldats!"  France  during  the 
war  established  conscription  in  her  African 
territories  and,  in  spite  of  a  somewhat  bloody 
rebellion  by  the  ignorant  savages,  who  thought 
the  slave  trade  was  being  reestablished,  suc- 
ceeded in  importing  to  France  a  black  army 
which  at  one  time  numbered  600,000  fighting 
men.  With  a  little  more  energy  and  greatly 
increased  territories,  that  number  might  be 
trebled.  France  is  a  smaller  nation  than  Ger- 
many;  but  France  plus  Algeria,  Tunis,  Morocco, 
Senegambia,  French  Congo,  and  the  new  Ger- 
man territories  is  a  much  larger  nation  than 
Germany  without  colonies.  And  blacks  fortu- 
nately have  not  the  same  rights  as  white  men ! 

A  permanently  wrecked  Germany,  vast 
black  armies  for  France,  armed  allies  always 
ready  on  Germany's  eastern  frontier;  with  these 
conditions  fulfilled,  France,  it  is  hoped  by 
these  politicians,  may  at  last  breathe  freely. 

•        •        •        .       .  •        •        >        •        « 

What  is  wrong  with  this  policy?  You  may 
40 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

call  it  devilish,  if  you  will,  since  it  is  based  on 
the  deliberate  and  artificial  creation  of  human 
misery;  but  is  it  bad  policy?  After  all,  air- 
bombs  and  poison  gas  and  the  like  may  be 
called  devilish.  But,  devilish  or  not,  they  have 
sometimes  to  be  used.  If  Germany  is  certainly 
and  confessedly  looking  out  for  the  next  oppor- 
tunity of  escaping  from  the  consequences  of 
the  treaty  and  retrieving  her  fortunes  on  the 
battlefield,  is  not  France  bound  to  take  every 
precaution  to  see  that  Germany  shall  never  be 
strong  enough  to  do  so  with  success?  The  next 
war  will  be  far  worse  than  the  last.  The  terms 
imposed  on  the  beaten  party  will  be  even  more 
desolating  and  destructive.  France  is  probably 
a  less  vigorous  plant  than  her  enemy.  She  has 
failed  to  kill  Germany,  but  Germany  might 
succeed  in  killing  her. 

It  seems  that  Germany  is  absolutely  bound 
to  fight,  if  there  is  no  other  way  of  recovering 
her  freedom  and  her  right  to  live,  while  France 
is  absolutely  bound  to  hold  her  enemy  down 
mercilessly,  if  there  is  no  other  way  of  securing 
her  own  safety. 

41 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

III.  THE  SOLUTION 

BUT  perhaps  after  all  there  is.  Last  among  the 
Fourteen  Points  came  the  proposal  to  found 
"A  general  Association  of  Nations  under  spe- 
cific covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording  mu- 
tual guarantees  of  political  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  to  small  and  great  states 
alike."  The  Treaty  of  Versailles  has  after  all 
two  faces.  It  had  to  express  two  great  waves  of 
feeling  and  two  international  necessities.  Mr. 
Wilson  was  not  so  utterly  "bamboozled"  as 
Mr.  Keynes  would  have  us  believe.  General 
Smuts  and  Lord  Robert  Cecil  were  not  so  ut- 
terly without  influence  on  the  settlement.  The 
least  depressing  paragraphs  in  the  Allied  Reply 
to  the  German  delegation  are  those  in  which 
they  explain  that  the  terrific  severity  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  treaty  applies  only  to  a 
"transition  period"  of  punishment,  of  repara- 
tion and  of  trial,  at  the  end  of  which  they  see 
the  realization  of  Mr.  Wilson's  promises.  "The 
conditions  of  peace  contain  some  provisions 
for  the  future  which  may  outlast  the  transition 

42 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

period  during  which  the  economic  balance"  — 
between  Germany  and  the  invaded  countries 
—  "is  to  be  restored;  and  a  reciprocity  is  fore- 
seen after  that  period  which  is  very  clearly  that 
equality  of  trade  conditions  for  which  Presi- 
dent Wilson  has  stipulated."  The  phrasing  of 
the  paragraph  is  awkward,  but  the  main  drift 
is  clear.  The  Fourteen  Points  are  accepted,  but 
adjourned;  when  Germany  has  been  punished 
and  reparation  made,  they  will  come  into  force. 
"The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  look  for- 
ward to  the  time  when  the  League  of  Nations 
established  by  this  treaty  shall  extend  its  mem- 
bership to  all  peoples."  "They  see  no  reason 
why  Germany  should  not  become  a  member  of 
the  League  in  the  early  future,"  provided  she 
satisfies  certain  tests.  "It  has  never  been  their 
intention  that  Germany  or  any  other  Power 
should  be  indefinitely  excluded  from  the 
League  of  Nations."  They  are  convinced  that 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  "introduces  an 
element  of  progress  into  the  relations  of  peo- 
ples which  will  develop  and  strengthen  to  the 
advantage  of  justice  and  of  peace." 
43 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

This  is  as  it  should  be;  but  the  world  does  not 
stand  still  while  Germany  is  making  reparation 
and  being  taught  gradually  to  love  her  chas- 
tisers.  If  the  League  "  introduces  an  element  of 
progress,"  the  sooner  it  gets  to  work  the  better. 
It  is  only  too  clear  that  every  month  which 
passes  with  the  League  entirely  dominated  by 
England,  France,  and  Italy  encourages  and 
deepens  the  suspicion  with  which  the  League  is 
regarded  by  its  critics.  I  say  nothing  of  Ameri- 
can criticisms,  in  which  many  factors  cooper- 
ate. But  the  Swiss  Federal  Council,  in  the  very 
able  and  persuasive  message  which  it  issued  to 
the  Assembly  on  February  17,  1920,  in  favour 
of  joining  the  League,  has  to  deal  with  this  sus- 
picion. "One  has  been  tempted  at  times  to  con- 
sider the  League  as  an  alliance  of  the  conquer- 
ors against  the  conquered.  The  fact  that  Ger- 
many, Austria,  and  the  former  Russian  Empire 
remain  provisionally  excluded  from  the  League 
may  have  given  a  semblance  of  truth  to  this 
manner  of  thinking."  The  suspicion  is  after- 
wards described  as  "this  apparently  accurate 
criticism."  Switzerland  as  a  whole  has  fortu- 

44 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

nately  rejected  the  suspicion  and  by  a  small 
majority  joined  the  League.  But  in  most  of 
Central  Europe  the  League  of  Nations  move- 
ment is  strangled  in  its  birth  by  the  general 
feeling  that  the  present  League  means  merely 
the  Entente  Powers  and  their  clients,  and  the 
elements  for  starting  a  counter-league  are  con- 
solidating month  by  month.  This  counter- 
league  would  probably  not  be  an  open  and  con- 
fessed alliance.  But  Russia,  Germany,  and  the 
United  States  are  still  outside,  and  there  are 
many  unpaid  grudges  amongst  the  Moslems  of 
Asia.  The  test  which  is  exacted  by  Article  I 
from  any  new  state  desiring  to  become  a  mem- 
ber of  the  League  is  that  "it  shall  give  effective 
guarantees  of  its  sincere  intention  to  observe  its 
international  obligations."  Interpreted  with 
theological  strictness,  this  would  probably  re- 
sult in  the  rejection  of  all  candidates,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  expulsion  of  many  of  the  original 
members.  Perfect  sincerity  in  observing  un- 
pleasant obligations  is  not  a  common  charac- 
teristic of  human  societies.  But  in  the  ordinary 
sense  of  the  words  the  test  is  already  satisfied 
45 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

by  Germany  and  Austria  and  most  of  the  suc- 
cession states.  The  Assembly  of  the  League 
meets  for  the  first  time  on  November  15,  1920. 
It  ought  not  to  dissolve  without  admitting  to 
its  membership  Germany  and  Austria,  as  well 
as  several  other  candidates  who  have  already 
applied.  At  the  moment  of  writing  (Novem- 
ber, 1920),  Lord  Grey,  Lord  Selborne,  and 
Mr.  Barnes  have  issued  a  joint  appeal  for  the 
immediate  admission  of  Germany,  which  has 
long  been  the  accepted  policy  of  the  League  of 
Nations  Union.  There  are  many  obstacles,  but 
the  result  will  doubtless  be  known  before  these 
words  are  in  print.  Fortunately,  the  admission 
of  new  members  is  decided  by  a  two-thirds  ma- 
jority of  the  Assembly  and  does  not  require  a 
unanimous  vote.  Once  the  League  is  estab- 
lished on  a  broad  base,  including  the  conquered 
nations  on  equal  terms  with  the  victorious,  the 
prospect  of  that  war  of  revenge  which  has 
hitherto  seemed  almost  inevitable  will  dwindle 
and  become  remote. 

•  »••••••  • 

The  hope  expressed  above  has  not  been  real- 
46 


'  GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

ized.  Austria,  Bulgaria,  and  many  less  impor- 
tant states  applied  for  admission  to  the  League 
and  were  accepted,  but  French  feeling  was 
known  to  be  very  strong,  and  Germany  did  not 
even  apply.  Had  she  done  so  she  would  proba- 
bly have  had  a  majority  in  her  favour,  and  it 
was  considered  until  the  beginning  of  March, 
1921,  that  she  was  certain  of  admission  at  the 
next  meeting  of  the  Assembly  in  September. 
But  in  the  meantime  untoward  events  have 
taken  place. 

The.French  Government,  like  the  English,  ob- 
tained success  at  the  elections  by  wild  promises 
to  make  Germany  pay  all  the  costs  of  the  war. 
As  M.  Poincar6  has  observed,  "the  French  peo- 
ple will  not  understand  how  the  victors  in  a 
great  war  can  be  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy." 
Consequently  they  think  their  rulers  are  cheat- 
ing them.  Educated  people,  in  France  as  in 
England,  have  long  since  ceased  to  expect  much 
from  German  indemnities,  but  the  Govern- 
ments still  depend  on  their  appeal  to  mob- 
psychology;  and  it  was  believed  that  if  M.  Bri- 
and  ventured  to  make  any  concessions  in  the 
47 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

direction  of  reason  or  moderation  he  would  lose 
his  majority  in  the  Chamber.  The  proposals 
made  at  the  Inter-Allied  Conference  at  Brus- 
sels and  drawn  up  by  the  French  expert,  M. 
Seydoux,  had  been  silently  dropped  as  unsatis- 
fying; the  subsequent  British  proposals  made 
at  Boulogne  had  been  rejected  for  the  same 
reason.  It  was  necessary,  however,  to  make 
some  definite  proposals  to  Germany  without 
much  further  delay,  since  the  treaty  had  laid 
down  May  1, 1921,  as  the  time  for  a  settlement. 
Germany  was  by  that  time  to  have  paid  a  thou- 
sand million  pounds  on  account,  and  was  to 
learn  the  extent,  finite  or  infinite,  of  the  total 
bill.  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  as  might  have  been  ex- 
pected, showed  much  sympathy  with  M.  Bri- 
and  in  his  awkward  position,  and  agreed  to 
a  demand  for  reparations  on  a  scale  which 
was  obviously  fantastic.  It  began,  reasonably 
enough,  with  a  system  of  annuities,  though  the 
first  figure  was  probably  too  high  and  the  last 
figures  can  scarcely  have  been  meant  seriously. 
Germany  was  to  pay  £150,000,000  a  year  for 
the  first  five  years;  then  the  annual  sum  was  to 
48 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

increase  at  intervals  for  the  extraordinary  pe- 
riod of  forty-two  years,  towards  the  end  of 
which  time  Germany  was  expected  to  pay  an- 
nually £300,000,000,  or  half  as  much  again 
every  year  as  the  total  indemnity  exacted  from 
France  after  the  war  of  1870.  Even  that  was 
not  enough  for  a  population  which  had  been 
sedulously  fed  on  lies  by  a  class  of  politician 
who  at  times  seem  to  possess  among  them  no 
single  sane  and  honest  man.  And  an  additional 
payment  was  demanded  of  a  yearly  sum  equiv- 
alent to  a  duty  of  twelve  per  cent  ad  valorem  on 
all  German  exports. 

Opinion  in  Germany  was  sharply  divided. 
All  they  had  to  pay  with  was  an  enormous 
deficit  on  the  Budget,  with  the  prospect  of  pres- 
ently losing  the  Silesian  coal-mines  and  having 
prohibitive  duties  placed  by  the  Allies  upon 
their  exports.  One  party  insisted  that  the  Gov- 
ernment should  make  no  promise  which  it  could 
not  expect  to  perform ;  another,  that  what  Ger- 
many wanted  was  peace,  and  that  they  had 
better  sign  anything  required  of  them.  The 
first  party,  on  the  whole,  carried  the  day.  The 
49 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

German  delegation  in  London  made  a  counter- 
proposal based,  very  sensibly,  on  the  idea  of 
finding  the  present  value  of  the  forty-two-year 
annuities  and  raising  that  sum  by  means  of  a 
loan;  but  as  they  worked  out  the  idea  they 
favoured  Germany  on  every  detailed  calcula- 
tion to  an  extent  which  they  must  have  known 
to  be  unacceptable.  Apparently  they  expected 
a  long  and  serious  bargaining  march.  But,  to 
most  people's  surprise,  Mr.  George  leapt  with 
alacrity  at  the  prospect  of  a  rupture.  The  pro- 
posal was  rejected  with  every  semblance  of  vir- 
tuous indignation.  No  time  was  allowed  for  the 
delegation  to  consult  the  German  Government. 
A  hurried  second  proposal,  to  pay  the  terms 
demanded  for  five  years  and  then  have  the 
matter  reconsidered,  was  tossed  aside  without 
consideration,  and  French  and  British  troops 
proceeded  to  invade  Germany,  occupy  more 
territory,  and  set  up  a  new  and  artificial  cus- 
toms-barrier in  the  most  unsuitable  places,  at 
which  they  proceeded  themselves  to  collect  the 
German  customs. 

The  plan  is  very  expensive,  and  utterly  un- 
50 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

profitable.  It  involves  a  straining  if  not  a 
breach  of  the  treaty,1  and  it  is  likely,  if  any  un- 
toward event  occurs,  to  provoke  a  war  of  the 
most  humiliating  and  embittered  kind  —  the 
war  of  a  desperate  and  helpless  population  try- 
ing to  rid  themselves  of  foreign  oppressors.  But 
it  has  saved  M.  Briand's  Government.  If  he 
had  agreed  to  accept  any  German  terms  what- 
ever, he  would  have  been  upset  for  not  exacting 
more.  But  if  he  marches  French  and  British 
troops  into  the  heart  of  Germany  no  one  can 
accuse  him  of  lack  of  spirit.  So  for  the  present 
all  is  well;  and  as  for  the  future,  it  is  conceiv- 
able that  the  Germans  will  give  way  and  make 

1  The  Allies  are  apparently  acting  under  Part  VIII,  clause 
18,  of  the  treaty.  This  gives  them  the  right  to  "take  such  other 
measures  as  the  respective  Governments  may  determine  to  be 
necessary"  in  case  of  "voluntary  default"  by  Germany  in  the 
payment  of  her  dues  under  Part  VIII  (Reparations).  A  failure 
by  Germany  to  disarm  sufficiently  gives  the  Allies  no  right  to 
increase  the  area  of  their  occupation,  since  the  present  occupa- 
tion is  specifically  laid  down  in  the  treaty  negotiations  as  the 
means  of  enforcing  disarmament.  Nor  has  Germany  yet  actu- 
ally committed  a  voluntary  default  in  the  payment  of  her  rep- 
arations, since  the  first  payment,  £100,000,000,  is  not  to  be 
completed  until  May  1, 1921.  I  am  informed  on  high  authority 
that  the  Allied  case  probably  rests  on  the  point  that  they  judge 
by  their  debtor's  manner  and  by  statements  which  she  has 
made  that  she  intends  not  to  pay  by  May  i;  according  to 
English  law  this  would  apparently  give  them  some  right  of 
taking  immediate  action. 

51 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

some  impossible  promise.  That  will  increase 
M.  Briand's  prestige.  It  is  more  likely  that  they 
will  simply  sit  still  and  let  the  Allied  armies  do 
their  worst.  Then  there  will  be  a  chance  of 
carrying  out  one  of  the  darling  aims  of  the 
French  chauvinists,  and  annexing,  or  at  least 
separating  from  Germany,  all  the  German  prov- 
inces which  they  occupy. 

In  face  of  these  lunatic  proceedings  the  Ger- 
man Government  has  behaved  with  consider- 
able dignity  and  good  sense,  though  naturally 
the  German  newspapers  are  running  a  little 
wild.  It  has  announced  its  intention  of  appeal- 
ing to  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
and  although,  not  being  a  member,  Germany 
cannot  herself  raise  the  subject,  it  may  be  taken 
as  certain  that  some  member  will  take  it  up 
on  her  behalf.  This  produces  a  most  critical 
situation. 

According  to  the  Covenant,  Article  III,  the 
Assembly  may  be  summoned  to  meet  "from 
time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require."  But 
presumably  it  is  the  Council  which  decides 
whether  occasion  does  require  it  or  not,  and  no 

52 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

one  can  expect  the  Council  to  favour  Germany's 
appeal.  The  appeal  will  only  be  considered 
when  the  Assembly  has  its  next  regular  meet- 
ing in  September.  We  shall  then  see  whether 
the  Assembly  possesses  the  force  and  courage 
necessary  to  discuss  freely  and,  if  necessary, 
to  condemn  the  actions  of  the  two  leading  Euro- 
pean Powers;  or  if  the  two  can  successfully 
silence  all  criticism.  For  my  own  part  I  think 
the  discussion  will  take  place ;  and  that,  for  the 
first  time  since  the  war,  the  voice  of  an  impar- 
tial third  party  will  be  heard  in  discussing  the 
terms  imposed  on  Germany  by  her  conquerors. 
That  does  not  mean  the  realization  of  the  "en- 
thronement of  public  right  on  the  common 
law  of  nations,"  but  it  is  one  of  the  first  steps 
toward  it. 
•  •••••••• 

The  League  of  Nations  is  in  a  position  to  say 
to  France:  "You  are  afraid  of  another  attack 
by  Germany ;  and  to  avert  that  danger  you  pro- 
pose in  various  ways  to  follow  a  policy  which 
will  plunge  Europe  into  continued  distress.  We 
hereby  guarantee  you  against  attack.  Thirty- 
53 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

nine  nations  at  present,  who  will  shortly  be  in- 
creased to  fifty-one,  if  not  more,  have  signed  a 
definite  and  unqualified  contract  to  preserve 
your  'existing  political  independence  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity '  against  any  '  external  aggres- 
sion ' ;  and  further,  if  you  are  attacked  in  such  a 
way  as  not  actually  to  threaten  your  territory 
or  independence,  all  the  States  of  the  League 
will  consider  that  an  act  of  war  has  been  com- 
mitted against  themselves,  will  apply  the  com- 
plete economic  boycott  to  your  enemy,  and  ar- 
range plans  for  giving  you  immediate  military 
support.  We  offer  you  here  a  far  more  effective 
guarantee  of  safety  than  you  can  possibly  at- 
tain by  your  own  diplomacy.  But  we  demand  in 
return  that  your  foreign  policy  shall  be  frankly 
and  sincerely  a  League  of  Nations  policy ;  that 
you  shall  not  make  secret  treaties,  not  set  up  in- 
equitable tariffs,  not  plot  the  ruin  of  your  late 
enemies  or  any  other  people;  but  work  as  a 
loyal  member  of  the  League  with  a  view  to  the 
welfare  of  the  whole." 

The  League  says  to  Germany:  "You  com- 
plain of  the  undue  severity  of  the  treaty  and  the 

54 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

impossibility  of  carrying  out  its  economic  pro- 
visions. Commissions  already  exist,  and  you 
have  taken  part  in  them,  for  discussing  these 
latter  and  fixing  the  terms  of  the  reparation 
which  you  owe.  But,  beyond  that,  if  there  is 
any  clause  in  the  treaty  which  appears  to  any 
member  of  the  League  as '  threatening  to  disturb 
international  peace  or  the  good  understanding 
between  nations  upon  which  peace  depends,' 
it  will,  under  Article  XI,  be  brought  before  the 
League  and  considered.  Further,  if  any  clause 
in  the  treaty  appears  to  '  have  become  inappli- 
cable' or  to  give  rise  to  'international  condi- 
tions which  might  endanger  the  peace  of  the 
world,'  under  Article  XXIII  the  Assembly  of 
the  League  may  at  any  time '  advise  their  recon- 
sideration.' You  complain  that  the  terms  of  the 
present  treaty  were  imposed  upon  you,  with- 
out discussion,  by  implacable  enemies  who  had 
you  at  their  mercy ;  that  you  have  been  made  a 
sort  of  outlaw  nation,  without  freedom,  without 
colonies,  without  ships,  sitting  apart  while  the 
world  is  administered  by  your  enemies.  But 
at  our  Assembly  table  you  will  sit  as  an  equal 
55 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  free  member,  with  the  same  rights  as  those 
who  were  lately  your  conquerors.  We  submit 
to  you  that  this  gives  you  a  far  better  chance 
of  improving  your  condition  than  another  war 
could.  Your  lot  must  be  for  some  time  a  hard 
one.  That  is  inevitable,  and  we  cannot  think  it 
unjust.  You  challenged  the  Entente  to  war, 
you  staked  all  on  victory,  and  you  were  beaten. 
Now  you  have  to  make  reparation.  But  the  re- 
cuperative power  of  a  great  nation  is  immense ; 
and  wherever  you  have  been  subjected  to  a  def- 
initely unjust  or  dangerous  condition,  we  offer 
you  a  remedy.  Wherever  you  may  have  a  dis- 
pute with  any  other  Power,  we  offer  you  a  Court 
of  Arbitration  as  impartially  constituted  as  the 
wit  of  man  could  devise." 

r 
•  •  •  •  •  •  •*•  • 

At  present  neither  party  quite  believes  this 
guarantee.  If  they  did,  it  would  probably  be 
enough  for  them.  It  used  to  be  said  of  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  in  the  Balkan  Conferences  that  he 
was  not  only  sincere;  he  had  the  power  of  mak- 
ing other  people  see  that  he  was  sincere.  If  Eu- 
rope is  to  be  saved  from  new  Great  Wars,  the 

56 


GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

Powers  of  the  League  must  first  of  all  be  sincere 
in  their  undertakings,  and  next,  they  must  con- 
vince the  world  in  general  of  their  sincerity.  To 
that  subject  we  must  return  later. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  EAST 

BUT  the  world  is  not  merely  threatened  by  the 
prospect  of  future  wars.  It  is  filled  with  wars  at 
the  present  moment.  There  are  quarrels  and 
bickerings  between  most  of  the  newly  liberated 
states  in  eastern  Europe ;  there  is  a  war,  some- 
times avowed  and  sometimes  underground,  be- 
tween Communist  Russia  and  all  her  neigh- 
bours and  rivals,  a  war  whose  tentacles  reach 
far  throughout  Europe  and  Asia;  and  there  are 
wars  against  the  British  and  French  in  various 
parts  of  the  East.  Let  us  briefly  touch  upon  a 
few  sample  cases. 

I.  SYRIA,  MESOPOTAMIA,  EGYPT,  AND  INDIA 
THE  simplest  case  is  Syria.  In  1915,  during  the 
war,  a  Syrian  National  Committee,  including 
representatives  from  Damascus  and  Mosul,  ne- 
gotiated with  us  through  Sherif  Husein,  and 
we  signed  a  document  promising  to  "recognize 
and  uphold  Arab  independence"  in  an  area  in- 
58 


THE  EAST 

eluding  the  whole  of  Arabia,  Palestine,  Syria, 
and  Mesopotamia,  except  (i)  Aden  and  (2)  the 
Syrian  coast.  Within  the  independent  area  we 
merely  claimed  for  ourselves  "a  measure  of  ad- 
ministrative control"  in  Bagdad  and  Bosra  — 
not  in  Mosul  —  and  reserved  any  special  inter- 
ests of  France.  The  French  were  informed  of 
the  negotiations  immediately.  They  expressed 
themselves  content  with  the  possession  of  the 
Syrian  coast,  and  agreed  in  our  promises  to 
Husein.  On  the  strength  of  this  agreement  the 
Hejaz  revolted,  and  Feisul's  army,  consisting 
mainly  of  Syrian  and  Mesopotamian  soldiers 
who  had  formerly  been  in  the  Turkish  service, 
fought  as  our  allies  to  the  end  of  the  war.  An 
attempted  rising  in  Syria  proper  was  crushed 
with  great  severity  by  the  Turks. 

In  1918  the  Syrians  welcomed  the  Entente 
armies  as  liberators,  and  were  again  promised 
their  national  independence,  though  this  time  it 
was  to  be  under  the  guidance  of  one  of  the  En- 
tente Powers  as  mandatory.  They  asked  that 
the  mandatory  should  be  England,  but  Eng- 
land had  too  much  on  her  hands.  The  Syrians 
59 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

next  asked  for  America;  but  America  refused 
all  mandates.  France,  meantime,  had  always 
claimed  special  rights  in  Syria,  and  England  by 
a  treaty  made  during  the  war  had  recognized 
Syria  as  a  French  interest.  If  they  must  be  un- 
der France,  the  Syrian  representatives  specially 
demanded  pledges  that  the  government  should 
be  a  civil  government,  that  a  certain  degree 
of  independence  should  be  allowed  to  the  na- 
tives, and  that  the  country  should  not  be  occu- 
pied by  French  troops.  How  far  these  pledges 
were  given  and  broken  by  the  French ;  how  far 
it  was  only  we  ourselves  who  gave  assurances 
which  we  had  neither  the  right  nor  the  power 
to  carry  out,  and  thus  unconsciously  deceived 
Feisul,  these  are  questions  still  in  dispute.  It 
seems  unfortunately  certain  that  the  Syrians 
considered  themselves  betrayed.  In  the  end, 
Syria  was  occupied  by  French  troops;  the  na- 
tive government  was  not  recognized,  but  dis- 
persed; there  were  raids  and  pitched  battles, 
and  the  Emir  Feisul,  one  of  our  most  popular 
heroes  during  the  Great  War,  was  expelled  from 
his  throne  and  country.  He  is  now  an  exile,  and 

60 


THE  EAST 

was  for  a  time  officially  forbidden  to  land  in 
England. 

France  so  far  has  neither  accepted  nor  asked 
for  any  mandate  from  the  League  of  Nations, 
and  appears  not  fully  to  realize  the  obligations 
undertaken  by  her  in  signing  the  Covenant  of 
the  League,  or  the  pledge  repeated  in  the  Reply 
of  the  Allied  Powers  to  Germany,  "that  the 
Mandatory  Powers,  in  so  far  as  they  may  be  ap- 
pointed trustees  by  the  League  of  Nations,  will 
derive  no  benefits  from  such  trusteeship." 

In  Mesopotamia  the  British  established 
themselves  during  the  war  after  a  long  and 
chequered  campaign  by  defeating  the  Turks 
and  capturing  Bagdad.  The  Indian  soldiers 
and  officials  who  were  in  command  showed  the 
most  praiseworthy  zeal  and  energy  in  proceed- 
ing at  once  to  develop  the  country:  to  drain 
and  irrigate,  to  plant  crops,  to  establish  order 
and  good  government  in  regions  which  had  not 
known  such  things  since  a  remote  antiquity. 
The  English  were  welcomed  as  liberators  and 
made  explicit  promises  to  set  up  an  independ- 
ent Arab  kingdom  under  a  "measure  of  British 
61 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

administrative  control."  So  much  propagan- 
dist literature  was  poured  forth  on  the  glories  of 
the  independent  Arab  nation  which  the  Eng- 
lish were  to  create,  that  serious  discontent  was 
caused  in  Egypt.  "Is  a  half-naked  Arab  to 
have  independence,  and  am  I  not  good  enough 
to  have  even  self-government?"  wrote  a  highly 
educated  Egyptian  to  a  British  official.  Mean- 
time the  actual  government  of  Mesopotamia 
became  more  and  more  severely  effective,  and 
remained  entirely  concentrated  in  the  hands  of 
the  British.  The  expenses  were  enormous  and 
the  rate  of  taxation  per  head  appears  to  have 
risen  to  four  times  what  it  had  been  under  the 
Turks.  The  productivity  of  the  country,  how- 
ever, was  so  great  as  to  hold  out  a  prospect  of 
almost  making  up  the  loss,  and  the  important 
oil-wells  at  Mosul  were  expected  to  do  so  com- 
pletely. The  native  cultivators  profited  by  the 
improved  harvests  and  the  increased  area  of 
cultivation,  and  the  expenses  of  government 
were  in  part  to  be  met  out  of  the  future  oil 
profits.  And  the  best  British  administrators 
were  certainly  beloved  by  their  people. 

62 


THE  EAST 

The  educated  classes  in  Bagdad,  the  sheikhs 
and  the  ex-Turkish  officials,  became  restive  at 
the  high  taxation  and  the  indefinite  delay  of 
"Arab  independence."  The  turbulent  desert 
tribes  and  the  disorderly  elements  in  general 
were  disgusted  at  the  good  policing.  But  there 
was  no  general  discontent,  because  personal 
assurances  were  given  to  leading  Arabs  that 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  which 
Great  Britain  had  signed,  laid  down  definitely 
that  Mesopotamia  was  to  be  recognized  provi- 
sionally as  an  independent  nation  and  that  the 
mandate  was  to  be  given  to  Great  Britain. 
There  would  be,  it  was  promised,  a  native  Gov- 
ernment with  a  British  Resident  to  advise  it, 
as  in  an  Indian  native  state.  Doubtless  the 
Government  would  also  ask  for  other  help 
from  England,  especially  in  the  matter  of  pub- 
lic works,  irrigation,  and  the  engineering  of  the 
oil-wells. 

But  the  League  issued  no  mandate.  Accord- 
ing to  rumour,  it  had  offered  a  scheme  of  man- 
date to  the  Great  Powers  concerned,  and  one 
at  least  of  them  had  refused  the  terms.  The 
63 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

precious  oil,  it  was  discovered,  had  already 
been  divided  by  a  private  treaty  between 
France  and  England,  which  left  only  a  small 
fraction  for  the  Mesopotamians  and  none  for 
the  rest  of  the  world.  There  was  no  attempt  to 
set  up  an  Arab  Government.  Some  beginnings 
were  occasionally  made  of  associating  Arab 
officials  with  the  Englishmen  who  did  the  real 
work  of  governing.  But  they  were  not  whole- 
hearted. A  letter  was  accidentally  divulged  in 
which  an  English  soldier  said  of  the  high  Arab 
official  attached  to  him,  "  I  will  soon  make  him 
lick  my  boots."  There  were  symptoms  of  dis- 
affection, non-payment  of  taxes,  the  resurgence 
of  old  discredited  Turkish  and  German  agents, 
open  rebellions.  And  the  Government  replied 
by  numerous  executions  and  punitive  expedi- 
tions. The  bombing  aeroplane,  which  had  re- 
vealed itself  as  a  very  convenient  weapon  of 
war,  proved  an  utterly  disastrous  instrument 
of  police.  The  British  liberators,  who  had  come 
by  the  special  desire  of  the  population  to  estab- 
lish a  free  Arab  nation  helped  by  friendly  ad- 
vice from  British  Residents,  ended,  according 

64 


THE  EAST 

to  Colonel  Lawrence's  estimate,  in  killing  ten 
thousand  Arabs  and  setting  the  whole  country 
in  a  blaze  of  war.  An  army  of  over  one  hundred 
thousand  men  is  now  reconquering  it.  And  at 
the  same  time,  perhaps  at  the  eleventh  hour 
and  perhaps  too  late  altogether,  that  section  in 
the  British  Government  which  believed  in  the 
League  of  Nations  and  wished  scrupulously  to 
carry  out  in  victory  the  pledges  it  had  given  in 
time  of  distress,  prevailed  to  bring  about  a  defi- 
nite change  of  policy.  Sir  Percy  Cox  and  Mr. 
Philby  were  sent  to  Mesopotamia  with  instruc- 
tions, so  it  was  stated,  to  reverse  the  previous 
policy  and  try  to  set  up  that  independent  Arab 
Government  which  we  had  promised  in  1915 
and  again  in  1917,  and  ought  to  have  set  work- 
ing before  the  end  of  1919.  The  "rebellion" 
will  doubtless  be  crushed,  and  the  native  Gov- 
ernment may  or  not  be  successfully  organized. 
There  is  a  strong  desire  among  the  Arab  leaders 
to  have  it  based  on  a  treaty  of  alliance  with 
Great  Britain  after  the  Egyptian  model,  and 
not  on  Article  XXII  of  the  Covenant.  In  any 
case  the  task  is  infinitely  more  difficult  than  it 
65 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

was  before  so  much  blood  was  shed,  and  the 
original  friendship  of  the  Arabs  turned  to  ha- 
tred. On  simple  men  executive  action  makes  a 
much  deeper  impression  than  policy.  In  Meso- 
potamia our  policy  itself  was  bad  because  it 
was  not  consistent.  It  was  a  muddle  of  two 
contradictory  policies,  resulting  in  confusion 
and  hypocrisy.  But  the  executive  action  seems 
to  have  been  such  as  to  make  the  chances  of 
even  the  best  policy  very  precarious.  A  govern- 
ment which  multiplies  the  taxes  by  four  and 
shoots  and  hangs  its  subjects  in  batches  is  sel- 
dom excused  because  of  its  good  drainage  or  its 
progressive  ideas. 

The  story  in  Egypt  is  shorter  and  perhaps 
less  unhappy,  but  essentially  similar.  Early  in 
the  war,  when  Turkey  joined  the  enemy,  we 
declared  a  British  protectorate  over  Egypt, 
accompanied  by  a  promise  to  give  the  country 
independence  or  free  institutions  at  the  end 
of  the  war.  This  in  itself  was  a  perfectly  good 
and  defensible  policy,  though,  to  be  correct,  it 
should  have  had  the  concurrence  of  Egypt. 
But  in  the  course  of  the  war  Egypt  became 

66 


THE  EAST 

full  of  discontent.  Experienced  officials  were 
wanted  elsewhere,  and  inexperienced  substi- 
tutes made  mistakes.  Labour  in  great  quanti- 
ties was  required  for  the  Army,  and  was  ob- 
tained through  native  contractors  or  headmen, 
who  practised  the  ordinary  Oriental  methods 
of  extortion  and  corruption  while  professing  to 
act  by  orders  of  the  English.  The  peasant  who 
was  dragged  off  to  forced  labour,  or  compelled 
to  buy  his  freedom  by  heavy  bribes,  blamed 
the  British  for  both.  At  one  time  Egypt  was 
garrisoned  by  large  numbers  of  Australian 
troops,  who  had  the  habit  of  thinking  of  all 
Asiatics  as  "blackfellows,"  and  whose  ways  of 
dealing  with  "blackfellows"  were  not  of  the 
gentlest.  The  seed  was  thus  sown  of  a  passion- 
ate hatred,  partly  just  and  partly  unjust;  and 
feeling  was  already  ripe  for  explosion  when  it 
transpired  at  the  end  of  the  war  that  the  Brit- 
ish Government  had  no  apparent  intention  of 
fulfilling  their  promise  to  confer  on  Egypt 
"free  institutions."  Open  rebellion  was  impos- 
sible, owing  to  the  presence  of  overpowering 
numbers  of  British  troops;  but  a  time  of  danger 

67 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  infinite  trouble,  well  controlled  by  Lord 
Allenby,  led  at  last  to  the  appointment  of  a 
Commission  under  Lord  Milner,  which  grasped 
its  almost  desperate  problem  with  great  cour- 
age and  skill. 

Among  other  curious  misfortunes,  it  turned 
out  that  the  word  "protectorate"  had  been 
translated  into  Arabic  by  a  term  which  denoted 
the  sort  of  protection  that  is  extended  to  an 
outcast  or  a  person  with  no  national  rights. 
The  Commissioners  were  met  on  their  arrival 
by  a  universal  boycott,  and  by  constant  threats 
of  assassination.  They  lived  in  considerable 
danger,  and  no  Egyptian  would  be  seen  speak- 
ing to  them.  But  tact  and  patience  gradually 
broke  down  the  boycott;  and  a  much  larger 
measure  of  agreement  was  obtained  with 
Zaghlul  and  the  moderate  Nationalists  than 
had  at  the  outset  seemed  possible.  After  in- 
quiry, the  Commission  has  taken  the  line  of 
recommending,  first,  the  cancellation  of  the 
Capitulations,  or  special  privileges  granted  to 
European  states,  which  have  paralyzed  the 
progress  of  Egypt  for  several  generations;  the 

68 


THE  EAST 

separation  from  Egypt  of  the  Canal  zone,  as 
a  special  British  interest  and  of  vital  impor- 
tance to  the  Empire;  the  retention  of  British 
advisers  in  two  posts,  the  ministries  of  Justice 
and  of  Finance  —  a  safeguard  without  which 
the  European  Powers  would  not  consent  to 
forgo  the  special  protection  of  the  Capitula- 
tions; and  in  other  respects  the  establishment 
of  Egypt  as  an  independent  national  state.  As 
far  as  is  possible  to  forecast,  it  looks  as  if  this 
settlement  would  succeed. 

The  history  of  recent  events  in  India  is  too 
large  and  complicated  a  subject  to  be  dealt 
with  here.  But  in  its  main  outline  it  has  been 
curiously  similar  to  that  of  the  other  regions  of 
the  East.  A  wonderful  response  from  almost 
the  whole  continent  to  the  need  of  Great  Brit- 
ain during  the  war;  blunders  of  the  War  Office 
and  reactions  of  discontent;  German  propa- 
ganda; Turkish  and  Pan- Islamic  intrigue;  re- 
pressive Press  Acts  and  Conspiracy  Acts ;  pas- 
sive resistance,  dangerous  riots,  and  widespread 
conspiracies;  the  severe  and  sometimes  lawless 
coercion  of  the  Punjab;  the  savage  massacre  of 
69 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Amritsar,  and  at  last,  amid  great  obstructions 
and  hesitations,  the  passing  of  the  Montagu- 
Chelmsford  Act  and  the  conferring  of  a  new 
and  liberal  constitution  upon  India.  It  is  the 
same  story  as  in  Egypt  and  Mesopotamia. 
So  much  time  was  wasted  in  doing  the  wrong 
thing,  that  when  at  last  resort  was  had  to  the 
right  thing  the  right  time  was  past.  The  In- 
dian Government  was  faced  with  great  diffi- 
culties and  very  real  dangers.  Its  errors  have 
been  so  signal  and  notorious  that  public  opin- 
ion is  apt  to  forget  or  ignore  the  admirable  skill 
and  patience  with  which  most  officials  steered 
their  districts  through  periods  of  extreme 
strain.  But  reforms  long  promised  were  delayed 
until  too  late.  The  executive  plunged  into  ex- 
cesses which  will  not  be  forgotten  for  centuries. 
And  when  the  long-hoped-for  reforms  at  last 
have  come,  it  may  be  that  they  come  to  a  peo- 
ple too  exasperated  to  give  them  a  fair  trial. 

II.  AN  EASTERN  POLICY 

THE  policies  here  described  have  been  so  full 
of  errors  that  it  is  hard  to  derive  from  them  a 

70 


THE  EAST 

very  clear  moral.  Government  without  prin- 
ciple has  many  conveniences ;  if  life  consisted  of 
isolated  moments  it  might  be  entirely  success- 
ful. But  life  is  continuous,  and  human  beings 
have  memories  and  expectations.  And  almost 
any  policy  that  is  continuous  and  consistent 
and  true  to  itself  is  more  likely  to  succeed  in 
the  end  than  a  mixture  of  momentary  expedi- 
ents and  plunges  for  safety.  It  is  conceivable 
that  a  perfectly  resolute  and  unfaltering  mili- 
tary coercion  of  India,  Egypt,  and  Mesopo- 
tamia might  have  succeeded.  But  such  a  pol- 
icy, if  it  was  ever  possible,  is  certainly  so  no 
longer ;  and  also  it  would  hardly  be  a  policy  for 
avoiding  international  strife.  And  that  is  the 
subject  we  are  considering. 

If  we  look  below  the  mistakes  of  policy  and 
administration  committed  by  the  British  or 
French  Governments,  we  find  underneath  the 
surface  a  profound  and  instinctive  resentment 
of  the  Moslem  East  against  the  Western  Pow- 
ers. The  Western  Powers,  which  for  conven- 
ience we  term  Christian,  have  been  for  some 
centuries  far  more  efficient  than  any  Moslem 
71 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN. POLICY 

state.  The  West  has  increasingly  taken  charge 
of  the  East;  beaten  it,  managed  it,  "run"  it, 
governed  it,  and  in  some  cases  exploited  it. 
Western  government,  or  at  least  British  govern- 
ment, has  been  just,  incorruptible,  impartial, 
strong,  intelligent,  far  beyond  ordinary  East- 
ern standards.  It  may  have  been  unsympa- 
thetic and  grossly  expensive;  it  may,  in  spite 
of  the  unexampled  personal  integrity  of  the 
whole  governing  class,  have  led  to  the  presence 
in  Eastern  countries  of  undesirable  money- 
seekers.  But  it  has  been,  on  the  whole,  essen- 
tially and  undeniably  good,  efficient  govern- 
ment, backed  by  a  military  power  which  com- 
mitted few  excesses,  lived  on  its  own  pay,  and 
never  failed  in  an  emergency.  No  one  who 
studies  even  superficially  the  history  of  aver- 
age Oriental  governments,  from  Morocco  or 
Bokhara  to  Oudh,  can  be  surprised  or  sorry 
that  they  have  been  superseded  by  the  better 
governments  of  the  West.  The  peoples  of  the 
East  themselves  have  gained  by  Western  pene- 
tration ;  nay,  more,  they  are  conscious  of  their 
need  of  the  West.  But  they  have  had  too  much 

72 


THE  EAST 

of  it;  they  resent  it,  and  they  are  frightened 
of  it.  The  Moslem  nations  have  lost  their  in- 
dependence one  after  another.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Great  War  only  one  Moslem  Power 
remained  free  and  powerful  —  the  Turkish 
Empire.  At  the  end  of  the  war  there  was  not 
one. 

The  Turks  were  not  popular  in  the  East. 
The  Syrians  and  Arabs  hated  them  almost  as 
much  as  their  Christian  subjects  did.  The 
Turkish  peasants  of  Anatolia  suffered  cruelly 
under  the  exactions  of  Constantinople,  espe- 
cially in  the  matter  of  military  service.  But  all 
through  the  Moslem  East  ran  the  consciousness 
that  the  Sultan,  with  all  his  faults,  was  their 
own  man.  He  was  the  acknowledged  Head  of 
the  great  majority  of  Moslems  in  the  world. 
He  was,  above  all,  the  last  barrier  that  seemed 
to  protect  them  from  the  overwhelming  flood  of 
Western  aggression,  and  the  last  great  Moslem 
figure  which  enabled  them  to  preserve  their 
self-respect. 

While  the  Turkish  Empire  stood,  the  Moslem 
peoples,  though  fallen  on  evil  days,  could  think 
73 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

of  Islam  as  an  independent  and  even  an  im- 
perial entity.  In  places,  doubtless,  they  had  to 
kiss  the  feet  of  dogs;  but  their  Caliph  still  ruled 
masses  of  Christian  subject  populations  and 
still  was  master  of  the  capital  city  of  the  world. 
With  the  fall  of  Turkey,  the  last  free  Moslem 
state  was  gone.  Not  here  and  there,  but  every- 
where throughout  the  whole  world,  the  faithful 
were  set  beneath  the  heel  of  these  rich,  drunken, 
pork-eating  idolaters  with  their  indecent  wo- 
men, their  three  Gods,  and  their  terrific  ma- 
terial civilization.  "Pan-Islamism,"  as  Mr. 
Toynbee  says,  "is  only  an  extreme  example  of 
the  feeling  at  the  back  of  almost  any  modern 
Oriental  movement  we  may  examine.  It  may 
take  aggressive  forms,  but  the  essence  of  it  is  a 
defensive  impulse.  Its  appeal  is  to  fear,  and  if 
the  fear  of  the  West  could  be  lifted  from  off 
the  minds  of  the  Oriental  peoples,  its  main- 
spring would  be  gone." 

The  problem  of  our  Eastern  policy  is  to  re- 
move that  fear.  And  that  ought  not  to  be  so 
very  difficult.  The  essential  fact  to  grasp  is 
that  the  East  needs  us  far  more  than  we  need 

74 


THE  EAST 

the  East.  We  need  markets;  but  that  idea  is 
only  suggested  to  us  by  the  fact  that  Eastern 
peoples  want  our  goods.  We  do  almost  every- 
thing better  than  they  do.  They  want  our 
textiles,  our  knives  and  tools,  our  engines  and 
ploughs,  our  books,  our  learning.  They  cannot 
make  railways  or  ships  without  us.  They  can- 
not work  their  mines  or  oil-wells  except  by 
Western  help.  They  cannot  really  govern  their 
countries  satisfactorily  without  European  ad- 
visers. The  language  of  Article  XXII  of  the 
League  of  Nations  Covenant  is  quite  correct 
when  it  says  that  "Certain  communities  for- 
merly belonging  to  the  Turkish  Empire  have 
reached  a  stage  of  development  where  their 
existence  as  independent  nations  can  be  pro- 
visionally recognized,  subject  to  the  rendering 
of  administrative  advice  and  assistance  by  a 
mandatory  until  such  time  as  they  are  able  to 
stand  alone."  At  present  "they  are  not  yet 
able  to  stand  by  themselves  under  the  stren- 
uous conditions  of  the  modern  world." 

They  ought  to  want  us,  and  if  left  alone  they 
would  want  us.  We  have  frightened  them  into 
75 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

fighting  and  hating  us  by  forcing  ourselves  upon 
them  instead  of  waiting  to  be  asked.  We  have 
conferred  incalculable  benefits  on  India:  the 
benefit  of  protection  from  invasion,  of  compara- 
tive protection  from  plague  and  famine,  of  so- 
cial order,  of  administrative  justice,  to  say 
nothing  of  roads  and  railways,  and  the  enliven- 
ing force  of  Western  knowledge.  We  have  im- 
mensely increased  the  prosperity  of  Egypt,  we 
have  put  down  all  kinds  of  Oriental  abuses  and 
protected  the  fellaheen  against  corvees  and  ex- 
tortions and  tortures.  We  were  in  process  of  be- 
ginning to  perform  the  same  services  for  Meso- 
potamia. But  in  the  latter  regions  at  any  rate 
—  for  in  India  our  roots  are  far  deeper  and  the 
problem  is  more  complex  —  the  people  did  not 
want  us.  We  only  held  them  and  did  them  good 
by  force.  And  the  chief  reason  why  they  did  not 
want  us  was  fear.  We  came  to  them  with  ma- 
chine guns  and  bombing  planes  as  conquerors 
and  masters,  having  destroyed  the  only  free 
Moslem  Power;  and  they  found  it  difficult  to  be- 
lieve in  our  good  intentions.  WTe  came  to  them, 
most  unfortunately,  also  with  specious  prom- 

76 


THE  EAST 

ises  which  we  made  in  time  of  need  and  broke 
in  the  days  of  victory. 

The  right  policy  is  something  very  easy  to 
state  and  extremely  difficult  to  carry  out,  even 
for  a  single-minded  and  clear-headed  Govern- 
ment. It  needs  first,  perhaps,  an  effort  of  im- 
aginative understanding  more  far-reaching  than 
has  ever  yet  in  history  been  demanded  of  an  Im- 
perial Power.  Only  those  who  understand  the 
East  can  win  the  respect  and  confidence  of  the 
East.  But  in  the  meantime,  if  we  cannot  fully 
understand,  there  is  a  way  at  least  to  make  our- 
selves understood.  Justice  is  the  passport  to 
confidence  all  the  world  over.  And  our  first 
business  is  to  act  quite  simply  and  sincerely  up 
to  all  our  engagements.  We  undertook  certain 
obligations  when  we  signed  Article  XXII  of  the 
Covenant.  We  should  make  the ' '  wishes  of  these 
communities  a  principal  consideration"  in  de- 
ciding whether  we  should  go  to  them  at  all.  We 
should  really  treat  them  "as  independent  na- 
tions," and  should  honestly  give  them  "admin- 
istrative advice  and  assistance  until  they  shall 
be  able  to  stand  alone."  And  we  should  not  al- 
77 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

low  our  minds  to  be  confused  by  thoughts  of 
gain,  nor  our  advice  to  take  the  form  of  horse, 
foot,  and  artillery.  Two  illustrations  may  make 
this  point  clear.  An  experienced  and  very  suc- 
cessful administrator  was  asked  a  few  weeks 
ago  whether  he  would  accept  the  post  of  ad- 
viser to  a  certain  Moslem  Government.  He 
said,  "Yes,  upon  one  condition.  That  there  is 
no  British  army  anywhere  in  the  country." 
That  is  the  right  and  wise  spirit.  The  second  is 
even  simpler.  One  of  the  most  obvious  and 
matter-of-course  obligations  laid  upon  imperial 
administrators  and  civil  servants  is  that  they 
shall  not  embark  in  trade  or  in  any  way  make 
a  profit  out  of  the  administration  of  their  office. 
That  is  the  right  rule.  The  Empire  should  set 
an  example  of  the  behaviour  that  it  expects 
from  its  best  servants. 

When  we  apportioned  to  ourselves  the  Ger- 
man colonies,  we  specially  declined  to  take  over 
their  public  debts.  And  when  protest  was  raised 
against  this  proceeding,  we  stated  definitely 
in  our  official  Reply:  "It  would  be  unjust  to 
make  this  responsibility  rest  on  the  Mandatory 

78 


THE  EAST 

Powers,  which,  in  so  far  as  they  may  be  ap- 
pointed trustees  by  the  League  of  Nations,  will 
derive  no  benefit  from  such  trusteeship."  Is  it 
entirely  quixotic  and  idealist  to  hope  that,  even 
in  post-war  conditions,  a  great  nation  may  re- 
main true  to  her  word? 

It  seems  at  least  as  if  the  only  alternative 
was  to  hold  these  Eastern  territories  by  armed 
force,  and  that  is  no  longer  possible.  It  might 
be  possible  to  hold  by  force  India  alone,  or 
Egypt  alone,  or  Mesopotamia  alone.  It  is  not 
possible  so  to  hold  all  three.  We  must  govern 
by  consent  of  the  governed  or  not  all. 


CHAPTER  III 

RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS 
ANOTHER  group  of  wars  and  threats  of  war  has 
its  centre  in  Moscow.  All  the  States  on  the  bor- 
ders of  Russia  —  Finland,  Lithuania,  Poland, 
the  Ukraine,  Hungary,  Rumania,  the  new  re- 
publics of  Georgia,  Armenia,  and  Azerbaijan, 
and  the  kingdom  of  Persia  —  are  either  at  war 
or  in  fear  of  war  or  just  recovering  from  war 
with  Russia,  or  from  civil  war  fomented  by  Rus- 
sian agents  and  propagandists.  Inside  Russia 
itself,  civil  war  has  never  ceased  since  the  first 
outbreak  of  the  Revolution  in  1917.  It  is  true 
that  the  civil  war  has  been  largely  helped  by 
foreign  munitions  and  stirred  up  by  foreign 
intrigues.  But  that  only  shows  that  —  as  the 
world  is  now  organized  —  there  is  something 
in  the  present  Russian  Government  which 
makes  foreigners  as  well  as  Russians  wish  to 
take  up  arms  against  it.  It  may  have  been  — 
I  think  strongly  that  it  was  —  exceedingly 

80 


RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS 

unwise  for  the  foreign  Governments  to  inter- 
vene in  the  domestic  troubles  of  Russia,  but 
no  one  can  pretend  that  the  civil  war  was  en- 
tirely created  by  foreigners.  The  rebellions 
were  there  before  the  foreigners  joined  in,  and 
it  is  even  thought  by  good  judges  that  the  op- 
position to  the  Bolsheviks  might  by  this  time 
have  been  successful  if  it  had  not  been  damned 
in  Russian  eyes  by  its  foreign  alliances. 

For  us  the  question  is  how  the  Russian  Revo- 
lution has  become  such  a  plenteous  and  intense 
cause  of  strife.  It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to 
pass  judgment  on  the  whole  of  a  vast  move- 
ment with  the  very  inadequate  information 
that  is  now  accessible  to  an  average  English- 
man about  Russia.  Even  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, which  has  been  studied  by  thousands  of 
observers  and  historians,  is  not  yet  judged. 
The  sum  of  infamies  and  high  achievements  is 
too  complicated  to  add  up.  And  the  Russian 
Revolution  is  probably  even  harder  to  value 
than  the  French. 


8l 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

I.  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

IT  would  be  a  mistake  to  forget  the  elements 
of  simple  early-Christian  brotherhood  which 
seem  to  characterize  the  Russian  peasant.  It 
was  well  known  before  the  war  how  the  mem- 
bers of  a  workmen's  artel,  or  trade  community, 
when  trade  was  bad,  would  divide  their  earn- 
ings equally  and  all  starve,  if  need  be,  together, 
without  any  attempt  by  the  luckier  workmen 
to  save  themselves  at  the  expense  of  the  others. 
The  glowing  descriptions  of  Mr.  Stephen 
Graham  cannot  be  entirely  without  any  basis 
in  fact.  And  the  people  of  Tolstoy  and  Dosto- 
ievsky have  evidently  a  most  rare  capacity 
for  sainthood  and  martyrdom,  as  well  as  for 
aberration  of  mind.  Present-day  Russia  has 
been  described  by  an  eminent  Socialist  as  "a 
nation  of  artists  governed  by  brutes,"  and  the 
phrase  is  probably  true  of  the  old  Russia  also, 
and  the  Russia  of  centuries  back.  Communism 
comes  easily  in  Russia,  and  so  does  submission 
to  tyranny. 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  Great 
82 


RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS 

War,  among  its  many  aspects,  involved  the 
most  frightful  and  bewildering  oppression  of 
the  poor  and  weak.  As  was  said  quite  truly: 
"Millions  of  poor  men  in  divers  regions  of  the 
world  have  been  dragged  suddenly  and  without 
any  previous  action  of  their  own  into  a  quarrel 
which  they  neither  made  nor  desired  nor  under- 
stood, and  in  the  course  of  that  quarrel  have 
been  subjected  again  and  again  to  the  very  ex- 
tremity of  possible  human  suffering."  The  war 
naturally  and  inevitably  created  in  Europe  a 
passionate  wish  for  some  revolutionary  trans- 
formation of  a  world  in  which  rich  and  clever 
people  in  parliaments  and  governments  had  the 
power  of  inflicting  such  pains  upon  the  poor. 
The  peculiarity  of  the  Bolshevik  movement 
was,  as  one  of  its  rare  English  admirers  puts  it, 
not  so  much  that  it  wanted  a  particular  kind 
of  Socialism  or  Communism,  but  that  it  wanted 
it  now.  The  world  has  seen  many  revolutions 
and  many  Socialist  governments ;  but  they  have 
never  really  established  that  paradise  of  the 
poor  which  was  advertised  in  their  prospectuses 
and  doubtless  nursed  in  their  hopes.  Most 
83 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

failed  altogether.  And  those  which  succeeded 
went  wrong.  They  cooperated  with  "bour- 
geois Liberals."  They  extended  the  franchise, 
they  improved  the  condition  of  the  working 
classes,  they  established  well-to-do  workmen 
and  peasants  with  a  stake  in  the  country  and  a 
conservative  bias;  but  they  never  really  did 
what  was  wanted.  They  always  stopped  short. 
They  developed  the  middle-class  virtues.  They 
left  still  in  existence  a  capitalist  class  which 
preached  the  merits  of  thrift  and  hard  work  and 
was  interested  in  trade ;  and  of  course  they  left 
always  somewhere  an  oppressed  class.  The  un- 
der dog  was  still  under. 

The  Bolshevik  remedy  was  very  direct  and 
simple.  It  was  to  disarm  everybody  who  had 
any  share  in  prosperity,  and  distribute  firearms 
to  those  who  had  nothing  else.  Only  when  he 
was  armed  and  the  rest  of  the  people  unarmed 
could  the  real  proletarian  —  the  man  who  had 
no  savings,  no  talent,  no  education,  no  notable 
good  qualities,  nothing  that  makes  for  success  in 
life  —  hope  to  beat  the  men  who  always  out- 
stripped him.  It  is  strange  that  even  in  a  mo- 

84 


RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS 

ment  of  extreme  misery  such  a  theory  could 
have  established  itself  in  any  country  as  a  prin- 
ciple of  government.  But  the  military  collapse 
of  Russia  gave  it  a  unique  chance.  The  com- 
mon soldiers,  anxious  to  fight  no  more,  already 
possessed  arms.  They  had  merely  to  murder 
their  officers  and  the  thing  was  done.  The  rest 
of  the  population  was  unarmed  and  helpless. 
And  meantime  the  peasants,  though  almost  un- 
touched by  revolutionary  ideas,  were  amenable 
to  one  particular  bribe.  The  revolutionaries 
offered  all  the  peasants  of  Russia  their  mas- 
ters' land  without  any  payment.  They  could 
simply  take  the  land,  and  kill  or  not  kill  the 
owner  as  they  pleased.  There  was  no  punish- 
ment for  such  killing.  According  to  strict  Com- 
munist principles,  the  land  was  not  to  remain 
in  the  peasants'  possession.  It  was  to  be  the 
property  of  the  State.  But  this  principle  had  to 
be  dropped  in  order  to  induce  the  peasants  to 
cooperate  with  the  revolutionary  town  work- 
men. Whatever  may  be  said  in  favour  of  this 
revolution,  there  can  at  least  be  no  surprise  at 
what  Lenin  calls  "the  frantic  resistance"  of  the 
85 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

upper  and  middle  classes  of  Russia.  The  policy 
of  the  Government  was  announced  on  January 
23,  1919:  "The  present  is  the  period  of  destruc- 
tion and  crushing  of  the  capitalist  system  of  the 
whole  world.  ...  In  order  to  establish  the  dic- 
tatorship of  the  proletariate  it  is  necessary  to 
disarm  the  bourgeoisie  and  its  agents  and  to 
arm  the  proletariate."  It  is  to  be  dictatorship 
in  the  strict  sense:  the  power  of  a  man  with  a 
gun  to  do  what  he  likes  with  those  who  have  no 
guns.  There  is  to  be  no  democracy  or  represen- 
tation of  the  dispossessed  classes.  If  they  were 
represented  they  might  recover  power.  Only 
those  known  to  be  faithful  to  the  new  Govern- 
ment are  to  vote.  All  persons  of  property  must 
be  dispossessed,  from  landlords  to  small  shop- 
keepers. Rich  peasants  must  go;  even  "mid- 
dle peasants"  at  one  time  had  to  go;  only  the 
poorest  peasants  and  the  poorest  town  work- 
men should  rule,  assisted,  of  course,  by  those 
educated  people  who  would  accept  the  new 
regime  and  establish  by  deeds  beyond  doubt 
their  hatred  of  the  bourgeoisie. 

The  control  of  a  country  by  a  small  minority 
86 


RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS 

is  always  difficult.  It  needs  methods  of  "ter- 
ror." But  this  minority  had  first  to  acquire  the 
control  and  then  to  maintain  it.  Its  task  was 
more  difficult  and  its  methods  had  to  be  more 
violent  than  those  of  its  predecessors.  The 
"terror"  of  the  old  Czarist  Government  or  of 
the  French  Revolution  must  be  superseded  by 
the  more  drastic  method  of  what  was  called 
"mass  terror."  The  secret  police,  whose  ac- 
tivities had  made  hideous  the  record  of  the 
Czarist  Government,  and  who  had  fled  for 
their  lives  at  the  first  outbreak  of  the  Lvof  and 
Kerensky  Revolution,  returned  from  their 
lurking-places  to  put  themselves  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  Bolsheviks.  This  legion  of  devils 
had  something  to  sell  which  the  new  Govern- 
ment badly  needed.  On  the  analogy  of  the 
Comite  de  Salut  Public  there  was  established 
the  All-Russian  Extraordinary  Commission 
for  stamping  out  all  trace  of  resistance  to  the 
new  order.  Spies  were  placed  everywhere 
(Proclamation,  October  17,  1918).  No  distinc- 
tion was  to  be  made  between  Czarist  reaction- 
aries and  unorthodox  Socialists,  such  as  the 
87 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Mensheviks  and  Social  Revolutionaries  (Russ- 
kaya  Zhizn,  May  10,  1919).  Enormous  num- 
bers of  "hostages"  were  arrested.  At  any  sign 
of  conspiracy  outside,  large  numbers  of  these 
were  shot.  The  assassination  of  the  Bolshevik 
Uritzky  was  repaid  by  the  execution  of  five 
hundred  citizens.  Yet,  just  as  in  the  most  furi- 
ous days  of  the  French  Revolution,  the  terror- 
ists were  always  complaining  that  there  was 
not  enough  terror.  "The  continual  discovery 
of  conspiracies  in  our  rear  .  .  .  the  insignificant 
extent  of  serious  repressions  and  mass  shoot- 
ings of  White  Guards  and  bourgeoisie  on  the 
part  of  the  Soviets,  show  that  notwithstanding 
frequent  pronouncements  urging  mass  terror 
against  the  Social  Revolutionaries,  White 
Guards,  and  bourgeoisie,  no  real  terror  exists" 
(Official  Weekly  of  the  All-Russian  Extraor- 
dinary Commission,  No.  I,  Moscow,  Septem- 
ber 21,  1918). 

Trotzky  in  [comforting  language  explained 
that  the  object  of  the  mass  terror  was  not  really 
the  extermination  of  all  non-communists,  or  all 
Russians  who  did  not  attain  the  full  standard 

88 


RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS 

of  poverty  and  orthodoxy.  "The  proletariate 
says :  '  I  shall  break  your  will  because  my  will 
is  stronger  than  yours,  and  I  shall  force  you 
to  serve  me.'  .  .  .  Terror  as  the  demonstration 
of  the  will  and  strength  of  the  working  class 
is  historically  justified"  (Trotzky  in  Izvestia, 
January  10,  1919).  Eventually,  of  course, 
when  all  Russia  was  submissive  and  all  Europe 
Communist,  there  would  be  a  gentler  regime, 
and  the  proletariate  would  show  their  true 
beauty  of  character.  And  it  would  be  a  mistake 
to  ignore  the  real  reforms  which  seem  to  have 
been  carried  through  in  certain  social  services, 
notably  in  the  care  of  children,  the  attempt  to 
develop  popular  education  and  the  putting 
down  of  drink.  But  in  the  meantime  terror 
was  reenforced  by  ingenious  petty  persecu- 
tions and  indignities,  reenforced  by  starvation. 
Those  who  joined  the  Red  Army  had  three 
times  the  ration  of  food  allowed  to  several  cate- 
gories of  the  civil  population.  No  one  can 
wonder  that  suicide  —  that  last  irrefutable 
evidence  of  unbearable  oppression  —  became 
extraordinarily  common,  especially  among  the 
,89 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

educated  classes,1  and  that  "frantic  resistance" 
broke  out  where  it  had  any  prospect  of  success. 

II.  RUSSIA'S  NEIGHBOURS 
Bur  what  of  the  war  outside  Russia?  Why 
could  not  the  Russians  be  allowed  to  conduct 
their  revolution  and  settle  their  form  of  govern- 
ment by  themselves?  It  would  be  very  desira- 
ble if  they  could.  And  doubtless  it  is  the  aim 
to  be  striven  for.  But  the  trouble  is  that  Bol- 
shevism is  to  its  adherents  a  revelation  and  a 
new  gospel,  and  they  have  the  same  zeal  for 
converting  the  rest  of  the  world  as  had  the 
French  Revolutionaries  or  the  followers  of  Mo- 
hammed. "The  program  of  the  Communist 
Party  is  not  merely  a  program  of  liberating  the 
proletariate  of  one  country ;  it  is  the  program  of 
liberating  the  proletariate  of  the  world"  (au- 
thorized pamphlet  by  N.  Bukharin,  July  24, 
1918).  This  is  to  be  achieved  by  "a  bloody  tor- 
turing and  heroic  fight."  The  methods  are  to 
include  every  known  form  of  intrigue,  corrup- 

1  The  remnants  of  the  moie  distinguished  "intellectuals" 
are  now  gathered  into  two  or  three  "salvage  houses"  and 
looked  after  by  Maxim  Gorky.  [He  has  now  fled.] 

90 


RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS 

tion,  forgery,  and  the  like,  and  the  plan  is  to  be 
the  same  in  all  countries.  Revolutionary  work- 
men are  to  be  armed,  including  common  sol- 
diers, tramps,  prisoners,  and  all  the  utterly  dis- 
possessed of  the  earth,  except,  of  course,  those 
who  have  Conservative,  Liberal,  or  Labour 
Party  views;  and  then  are  to  work  their  prole- 
tarian will  on  the  rest  of  the  community.  The 
"national  will"  is  to  be  disregarded:  "The  in- 
terests of  Socialism  stand  far  above  the  interest 
of  the  right  of  nations  to  self-determination" 
(Trotzky,  Izvestia,  March  8,  1918).  "All  our 
hopes  for  the  definitive  triumph  of  Socialism 
are  based  on  this  conviction  and  on  this  scien- 
tific prevision,  i.e.  that  a  revolution  like  the 
Russian  can  be  produced  in  all  the  nations  of 
Europe"  (ib.).  In  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk 
the  Bolsheviks  were  compelled  to  sign  a  clause 
promising  not  to  conduct  "any  agitation 
against  the  State  and  military  institutions  of 
Germany."  "But  both  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment as  a  whole  and  its  accredited  representa- 
tive in  Berlin  never  concealed  the  fact  that 
they  were  not  observing  this  article,  and  did 
91 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

not  intend  to  do  so"  (Joffe,  Izvestia,  January 

I,  1919). 

The  belief  that  by  some  single  violent  change 
in  social,  political,  or  economic  conditions  hu- 
man life  as  a  whole  can  be  suddenly  transfigured 
is  one  that  clings  to  many  minds,  and  by  no 
means  the  stupidest  minds,  of  the  present  age, 
in  spite  of  much  disillusioning  experience.  It 
does  seem  to  them  at  moments  as  if  only  some 
one  thing  was  wrong  with  the  world,  and  as  if 
that  one  flaw  must  surely  be  definite  and  re- 
mediable: some  one  bold  step  is  all  that  is 
needed  —  say,  the  abolition  of  the  family,  or  of 
property,  or  of  competition,  or  of  wages,  or  of 
interest,  or  of  compulsory  law,  or  some  other 
of  the  fundamental  institutions  of  society. 

To  our  ancestors  it  was  the  abolition  of 
heresy.  To  the  Turks,  the  abolition  of  all 
Christians  in  Turkey.  To  such  people  at  such 
times  the  normal  method  of  trying  to  correct 
the  worst  abuses  by  persuading  the  majority 
that  they  ought  to  be  corrected,  and  of  seeking 
individually  to  live  a  better  life  and  to  help 
one's  neighbours,  seems  tedious  and  ineffective, 

92 


RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS 

if  not  hypocritical.  But  one  thing  that  is  clear 
is  that  revolution  means  "frantic  resistance," 
and  the  stronger  the  faith  and  energy  behind 
the  revolution  the  more  deep-reaching  is  the 
resistance  likely  to  be. 

Russia's  neighbours  see  what  seems  to  them 
the  infinite  misery  and  impoverishment  and  re- 
tardation inflicted  by  Bolshevism ;  and  they  are 
naturally  indignant  and  alarmed  at  the  secret 
propaganda  of  Bolshevism  within  their  own 
borders.  In  normal  times  perhaps  they  need 
not  have  been  afraid.  But  since  the  war  every 
state  is  unstable;  every  state  has  a  large  discon- 
tented class.  The  small  republics  in  the  Cau- 
casus, barely  able  to  support  themselves  in 
freedom,  are  maddened  to  find  their  constitu- 
tion threatened  by  Russian  bribes,  their  mal- 
contents and  bad  characters  armed  with  Rus- 
sian rifles  and  machine  guns,  and  their  public 
men  assassinated.  Georgia  and  Armenia  are 
probably  doomed.  Hungary  and  Finland  have 
gone  Bolshevik  and  returned,  each  process 
being  accompanied  by  hideous  persecutions 
and  murders,  the  reprisals  being  naturally  the 
93 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

worst.  Germany,  in  spite  of  all  treaties,  has 
been  exposed  to  constant  propaganda  and  has 
had  one  or  two  bad  outbreaks  of  violence.  Po- 
land has  been  and  still  is — whether  through  her 
own  bad  policy  or  otherwise  —  on  the  brink  of 
compulsory  Bolshevism.  Human  nature  being 
what  it  is,  and  human  politics  a  little  worse 
than  private  human  nature,  it  is  inevitable  that 
Russia's  neighbours  should  be  constantly  afraid 
of  her  and  intensely  anxious  to  see  her  again 
under  some  more  normal  government;  some 
government  which,  whatever  its  political  bias, 
would  leave  its  neighbours  to  govern  themselves 
and  accept  the  ordinary  conventions  of  civi- 
lized society. 

Nay,  one  can  even  understand  anti-Russian 
policies  that  seem  at  first  sight  intolerably  ag- 
gressive. The  Poles,  among  other  demands,  are 
anxious  for  the  independence  of  White  Russia, 
the  region  north  of  the  Pripet,  of  which  Minsk 
is  the  chief  town.  They  wish  it  either  annexed 
to  Poland  or  else  made  independent,  but  at 
any  rate  cut  off  from  Russia.  The  claim  seems 
monstrous.  But  it  has  its  excuse.  The  White 
94 


RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS 

Russian  peasantry  are  said  to  be  peculiarly  ig- 
norant and  devoid  of  national  feeling;  the  land- 
owners and  well-to-do  classes  are  mostly  Poles. 
Is  it  surprising  that  the  Poles  of  Poland  hate 
the  idea  of  handing  their  countrymen  over  to  a 
Russia  which  will,  as  a  matter  of  course,  set  the 
peasants  to  burn  their  houses,  destroy  their 
cattle,  and  hunt  them  themselves  down  like 
vermin?  And  when  that  is  done,  they  reflect, 
Bolshevism  will  only  be  nearer  to  Warsaw. 

Like  the  early  Moslems,  the  true  Bolsheviks 
care  more  for  their  faith  than  for  territory.  In 
dealing  with  Lithuania,  which  is  at  present  a 
comparatively  quiet  little  peasant  republic,  the 
Russians  offered  her  a  large  slice  of  territory 
beyond  what  she  was  entitled  to  or  wanted. 
Why?  Because  it  was  a  thoroughly  Bolshe- 
vized  area,  and  might  be  expected  to  spread 
the  faith  —  or  the  poison  —  into  all  Lithuania. 
A  nation,  or  a  government,  in  that  state  of 
mind  cannot  be  surprised  if  its  neighbours  re- 
gard it  with  anxiety. 

It  is  a  curious  fact  that  revolutionists  so  often 
95 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

regard  themselves  as  pacifists.  Many  were 
even  conscientious  objectors  during  the  war, 
and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  they  were 
sincere.  But  they  do  seem  to  be  confused 
thinkers.  To  hate  your  neighbours,  whom  you 
know,  and  love  your  neighbours'  enemies, 
whom  you  do  not  know,  is  a  consistent  and  not 
uncommon  frame  of  mind;  though  the  element 
of  love  in  it  seems  less  important  and  prom- 
inent than  the  hate.  But  to  expect  European 
peace  and  good-will  by  means  of  a  revolution 
in  all  countries  argues  a  lack  of  understanding 
not  far  removed  from  madness.  Every  revolu- 
tionary outburst  since  the  war  has  been  marked 
by  ferocious  cruelties  and  followed  by  still  more 
ferocious  reprisals.  Revolution  leads  not  to 
peace,  but  to  reciprocal  reigns  of  terror,  first 
Red  and  then  White,  till  the  exhaustion  of  suf- 
fering produces  some  sort  of  equilibrium. 

The  war,  among  its  many  evil  lessons,  has 
inculcated  the  gospel  of  impatience  and  of 
force.  "When  you  want  a  thing,  take  it  from 
some  one,  and  if  he  resists,  knock  him  down." 
It  is  the  doctrine  which  destroys  human  socie- 
96 


RUSSIA  AND  ITS  BORDERS 

ties  as  it  destroys  the  peace  in  men's  own  hearts. 
If  we  want  peace,  we  must  simply  unlearn  that 
creed  and  go  back  to  the  old  Liberal  doctrine 
that  is  at  the  root  of  sound  politics  everywhere: 
"If  you  think  something  is  right,  try  to  per- 
suade your  fellow  citizens  of  it;  try  your  hard- 
est, but  remember  that  you  may  be  wrong,  and 
until  you  succeed,  have  patience." 


CHAPTER  IV 

PRE-WAR  AND  POST-WAR  CAUSES 
OF  STRIFE 

THE  war  has  left  behind  it  a  great  number  of 
small  wars  or  guerrillas.  Most  of  them  have 
their  explanation  in  some  ordinary  excess  of 
nationalism  or  revenge  or  greed.  The  Serbs, 
intoxicated  with  their  new  greatness,  are  still 
causing  war  in  Albania  and  Montenegro.  The 
Rumanians  recently  invaded  Hungary,  in  spite 
of  all  the  thunders  of  the  Peace  Conference,  be- 
cause they  had  been  robbed  by  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  wanted  revenge  and  reparation.  The 
Hungarians  have  alarmed  all  their  neighbours 
and  forced  them  into  a  defensive  alliance,  which 
now  calls  itself  the  "Little  Entente."  The  Lith- 
uanians and  Poles  have  fought,  but  been  recon- 
ciled by  the  mediation  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. The  Armenians  have  been  massacred 
again,  under  the  eyes  of  the  French  army  of 
occupation  in  Cilicia,  where  they  had  gathered 

98 


CAUSES  OF  STRIFE 

under  a  repeated  guarantee  of  safety  given  by 
France  and  England.  The  Turkish  National- 
ists are  holding  out  very  unsuccessfully  in  the 
centre  of  Anatolia  against  a  Greek  army  carry- 
ing out  the  directions  of  the  Supreme  Council. 
The  Turkish  peasants  are  increasingly  reluctant 
to  take  arms  again.  The  Koreans  have  help- 
lessly declared  their  right  to  independence  from 
Japan,  and  are  apparently  being  reduced  by  a 
terrible  persecution. 

These  are  the  mere  belated  effervescence  of 
the  passions  of  the  Great  War.  The  hate  and 
pride  which  are  the  basis  of  nationalism  and 
which  were  so  violently  stimulated  by  the 
events  of  the  war  cannot  be  expected  to  die  out 
at  once.  It  was  calculated  a  short  time  ago  that 
there  were  twenty-seven  "wars"  of  one  sort  or 
another  in  progress.  But  they  will  presumably 
simmer  down  as  social  conditions  become  more 
normal. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  two  of  the 
greatest  causes  of  war,  according  to  the  judg- 
ment of  normal  times,  are  now  not  actively 
operating.    Before  1914,  if  one  was  asked  to  ^ 
-99 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

name  the  main  causes  of  war,  the  answer  would 
have  been,  first,  competitive  armaments,  and, 
second,  protective  tariffs  and  the  competition 
for  markets.  These  causes  will  remain  fully  as 
dangerous  for  the  future,  but  it  so  happens 
that  none  of  the  existing  wars  is  directly  due 
to  either. 

I.  ARMAMENTS 

IN  one  sense,  indeed,  armaments  are  actually 
operating  now  as  a  cause  of  war.  There  are  far 
too  many  firearms  lying  about.  America,  Eng- 
land, and  France  have  made  very  lavish  gifts  or 
sales  of  lethal  weapons  to  various  bodies  with 
whom  they  sympathized.  And  the  arms  have 
by  no  means  always  stayed  in  the  place  for 
which  they  were  intended.  Guns  which  we  sent 
to  Denikin  were  sold  by  corrupt  officials  to  the 
Bolsheviks,  and  passed  on  by  them  to  the  Af- 
ghans to  use  against  us  on  the  Indian  fron- 
tier. Such  things  cause  some  deaths  and  some 
laughter,  but  are  not  permanent  evils. 

No  European  nation,  except  those  actually 
compelled,  has  made  much  progress  towards 
100 


CAUSES  OF  STRIFE 

disarmament.  It  is  said  that  Great  Britain  has 
actually  made  the  greatest  reduction,  but  both 
in  numbers  of  men  and  in  expenditure  our 
standard  is  fantastically  higher  than  what  was 
forced  upon  us  by  German  competition  in  1914. 
It  is  impossible  to  reduce  our  forces  in  a  really 
drastic  way  as  long  as  our  commitments  are  so 
large  and — perhaps  we  must  add  —  our  policy 
so  inconsistent  and  provocative.  Peace  with 
Russia,  a  settlement  with  Mesopotamia  and 
Egypt  on  the  lines  laid  down  by  the  Covenant 
and  the  Milner  Report,  the  evacuation  of  Ire- 
land, the  execution  of  the  Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms  in  India,  and  the  extension  of  similar 
reforms  to  Burmah  and  the  much-suffering 
Ceylon,  will  permit  us  really  to  envisage  for  the 
first  time  a  satisfactory  measure  of  disarma- 
ment. The  air  force  is  already  greatly  re- 
duced. The  vast  size  of  the  navy  appears  to 
be  utterly  unjustified,  at  any  rate  by  conditions 
in  Europe.  The  French  army  is  far  beyond  the 
economic  powers  of  France  to  support.  The 
same  seems  to  be  true  of  Italy,  and  is  certainly 
true  of  Serbia,  which  is  still  calling  conscripts 
101 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

to  the  colours.  Greece  is  vastly  overarmed ;  but 
Greek  policy,  though  erring  on  the  ambitious 
side,  has  probably  been  more  sagaciously 
guided  under  M.  Venizelos  than  any  in  Europe. 
The  fall  of  that  great  man,  due  mainly  to  the 
prolonged  economic  distresses  of  Greece,  will 
probably  cause  a  resurgence  of  Mustapha 
Kemal  and  the  Turkish  nationalists.  Mean- 
time the  Russian  conscript  army,  though  ap- 
parently ill-armed  and  ill-supplied,  is  over- 
whelming in  numbers  and  is  led  by  officers  of 
the  old  regime,  experienced  and  not  absolutely 
incompetent.  The  Russian  army  is  far  the 
greatest  and,  in  a  political  sense,  the  most 
dangerous,  in  the  world. 

But  it  is  not  the  actual  armaments,  ruinous 
as  they  are,  that  are  the  essential  poison  to  civ- 
ilized society.  It  is  the  competition  in  arma- 
ments. That  has  now  been  abolished  through- 
out Europe.  Slowly,  unequally,  reluctantly, 
the  armaments  which,  in  Lord  Grey's  words, 
went  uphill  under  the  lead  of  Germany,  are 
now,  under  the  same  lead,  groping  their  way 
downhill.  There  is  only  one  great  nation  which, 

IO2 


CAUSES  OF  STRIFE 

if  words  are  to  be  believed,  thinks  seriously  of 
starting  a  competition  in  armaments.  It  has 
been  announced,  more  than  once,  by  the  Amer- 
ican Government  that,  like  Germany  in  the 
years  before  1914,  they  have  arranged  a  naval 
programme  which  will  effectually  put  an  end 
to  the  British  command  of  the  seas  and  give 
the  United  States  "world  primacy"  (see  speech 
of  Mr.  Daniels,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in  the 
Times  of  September  I,  1920).  Since  the  British 
Empire  is  a  scattered  series  of  communities 
dependent  for  their  communications  upon  the 
sea,  and  in  particular  since  the  population  of 
Great  Britain  is  absolutely  dependent  for  its 
food  on  the  free  use  of  sea  transport,  it  has  been 
generally  acknowledged  in  Europe  that  the  sea- 
power  of  Great  Britain  was  necessary  to  its 
existence.  British  sea-power  has  never  been 
challenged  except  by  definite  enemies  in  pur- 
suit of  a  definite  war  policy.  If  the  United 
States  were  seriously  to  embark  on  the  same 
policy  as  the  late  German  Government,  it  seems 
as  if  all  other  causes  of  war  must  sink  into  in- 
significance beside  this  gigantic  and  deliberate 
103 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

one.  But,  in  spite  of  some  bewildering  symp- 
toms, it  can  hardly  be  believed  that  this  con- 
clusion is  possible,  at  any  rate  until  America 
has  definitely  and  finally  refused  to  be  a  mem- 
ber of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Relations  between  Great  Britain  and  Amer- 
ica have  of  late  been  dangerously  strained, 
partly  owing  to  causes  outside  our  Govern- 
ment's control,  but  in  part  owing  to  the  scandal 
caused  in  America  by  certain  developments  of 
the  Peace  Treaty,  and  by  the  excesses  of  the 
Government  forces  in  Ireland.  A  wise  policy 
may  help  to  heal  this  growing  breach,  and  if 
America  accepts  in  some  form  or  other  mem- 
bership of  the  League  of  Nations,  it  ought  to 
be  possible  in  friendly  discussion  to  arrive  at 
some  understanding  on  the  question  of  naval 
armaments. 

The  problem  of  armaments  is  put  in  the 
very  forefront  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League, 
immediately  after  the  constitution  of  the 
League  itself.  By  Article  VIII  — 

The  members  of  the  League  recognize  that  the 
maintenance  of  peace  requires  the  reduction  of  na- 

104 


CAUSES  OF  STRIFE 

tional  armaments  to  the  lowest  point  consistent 
with  (a)  national  safety  and  (6)  the  enforcement  by 
common  action  of  national  obligations. 

The  Council,  taking  account  of  the  geographical 
situation  and  circumstances  of  each  State,  shall  for- 
mulate plans  for  such  reduction  for  the  conside  a- 
tion  and  action  of  the  several  Governments. 

Such  plans  shall  be  subject  to  reconsideration  and 
revision  at  least  every  ten  years. 

After  these  plans  shall  have  been  adopted  by  the 
several  Governments  the  limits  of  armament  therein 
fixed  shall  not  be  exceeded  without  the  concurrence 
of  the  Council. 

The  article  goes  on  to  recognize  that  private 
munition  factories  are  objectionable,  and  must 
somehow  be  dealt  with,  and  to  lay  down  that 
all  members  must  interchange  "full  and  frank 
information"  about  their  armaments  and 
programmes.  And  the  next  article  constitutes 
a  permanent  Commission  to  advise  the  Coun- 
cil on  the  execution  of  the  provisions  of  Article 
VIII  and  other  similar  matters. 

The  cautious  language  of  the  Covenant  on 
this  subject  is  due  to  the  inherent  difficulty  of 
the  subject  itself.  It  would  be  absurd  to  lay 
down  that  every  member  of  the  League  must 
disband  its  forces  forthwith ;  the  League  could 
105 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

hardly  undertake  to  go  to  war  in  order  to  com- 
pel some  strong  Power  to  disarm.  And  it  is 
obvious  that  different  nations  need  different 
degrees  of  armament.  The  chief  difficulty  is 
that  disarmament  ought  in  justice  and  pru- 
dence to  be  simultaneous  all  round.  It  is  only 
by  the  compulsion  of  a  lost  war  that  Germany 
has  been  compelled  to  disarm  while  her  ene- 
mies stand  round  her  with  large  armies,  and 
even  in  Germany  the  process  is  evidently  very 
difficult  to  enforce.  Too  many  rifles  and  ma- 
chine guns  have  got  loose  in  private  hands.  No 
League  could  compel  Poland  or  Rumania  to 
disarm  while  the  Red  Army  of  Russia  stood 
waiting  across  the  frontier;  or  compel  Great 
Britain  to  disarm  while  the  northwest  frontier 
of  India  is  constantly  attacked,  while  the  Bol- 
sheviks are  in  Persia  and  British  officials  are 
besieged  in  Mesopotamia.  This  difficulty  will 
remain  even  when  the  world  begins  to  settle 
down  and  the  countries  of  Europe  are  no  longer 
governed  by  their  War  Offices.  On  the  other 
hand,  economic  pressure,  as  well  as  Liberal 
feeling,  will  make  for  the  reduction  of  armies 
106 


CAUSES  OF  STRIFE 

and  navies.  It  may  be  difficult  to  get  volun- 
teers for  military  service,  and  it  will  certainly 
be  dangerous  to  impress  conscripts.  There  will 
be  a  stronger  and  more  genuine  popular  de- 
mand for  disarmament  than  for  most  of  the 
desirable  provisions  of  the  League  Covenant, 
and  Governments  dependent  on  the  popular 
will  may  find  their  hands  forced.  But  in  the 
main  disarmament  must  depend  on  the  restora- 
tion of  confidence;  though  probably  it  is  true 
in  most  cases  that  if  the  disarmament  comes 
first  the  confidence  will  follow. 

II.  MARKETS  AND  FOOD 

THE  second  of  these  great  causes  of  war,  pro- 
tection and  the  competition  for  markets,  has 
somewhat  changed  its  aspect  since  the  com- 
parative exhaustion  of  the  world  supplies  of 
food  and  raw  material.  Before  the  war,  na- 
tions chiefly  wanted  to  sell.  Markets  were  the 
great  object  of  ambition,  and  tariff  walls  the 
great  means  of  offence.  Great  Britain,  of 
course,  kept  her  doors  everywhere  open  to  the 
trade  of  the  world.  It  is  one  of  the  decisive 
107 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

marks  to  her  credit  in  the  apportionment  of 
the  comparative  guilt  of  the  nations  in  prepar- 
ing that  international  atmosphere  which  made 
the  war  of  1914  possible.  But  if  she  had  chosen 
at  any  moment  to  close  her  doors,  she  could 
have  injured  grievously  every  other  great  na- 
tion throughout  the  globe;  and  the  British 
Tariff  Reform  Campaign  was  one  of  the  ex- 
cuses used  by  the  German  Government  to 
frighten  their  people  into  a  war  spirit.  When 
Austria  wished  to  ruin  Serbia  she  simply  put  a 
prohibitive  duty  on  the  import  of  pigs. 

Now,  since  the  war,  what  most  nations  want 
is  not  in  the  first  place  markets ;  it  is  food  and 
raw  materials.  They  have  not,  of  course,  abol- 
ished their  tariffs,  but  their  first  anxiety  is  to 
be  able  to  buy  food.  Austria  does  not  want  to 
keep  out  Serbian  pigs.  She  begs  for  them,  and 
Serbia  will  not  let  her  have  them.  The  most 
consistently  and  narrowly  protectionist  na- 
tions, like  France  or  Australia,  no  longer  con- 
centrate on  forbidding  their  neighbours  to  sell 
to  them.  On  the  contrary,  they  refuse  to  sell 
food  and  raw  material  to  their  neighbours.  The 
108 


CAUSES  OF  STRIFE 

policy  of  keeping  the  food  and  raw  materials  of 
the  British  Empire  for  British  consumption  is 
already  widely  advocated  and  has  powerful 
champions  in  the  Government.  As  long  as  it  is 
confined  to  palm  kernels,  this  policy,  though 
bad  from  almost  every  point  of  view,  is  not 
fatal.  But  if  ever  it  were  to  be  carried  con- 
sistently through,  it  would  mean  war.  The 
British  Empire  holds  such  a  vast  extent  of  the 
earth's  surface  that  it  has  inevitably  given 
hostages  to  fortune.  So  huge  an  empire  can 
only  be  tolerated  if  it  behaves  tolerably.  If  we 
keep  to  ourselves  and  use  for  our  own  profit 
all  the  overwhelmingly  large  stores  of  food  and 
raw  material  which  by  our  vast  annexations 
of  territory  we  now  control,  thereby  reducing 
other  nations  first  to  a  stagnation  of  trade  and 
then  to  starvation,  the  natural  and  inevitable 
answer  to  such  a  proceeding  would  seem  to  be 
a  world  crusade  for  our  destruction. 

This  is  the  chief  point,  apparently,  in  which 
the  influence  of  what  is  called  " capitalism" 
seems  to  be  a  direct  cause  of  war.   Great  cap- 
italists, or  those  impersonal  organizations  of 
109 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

capital  which  seem  likely  now  to  supersede  the 
individual  capitalist,  are  normally  strong  in- 
fluences for  peace.  They  need  peace  for  the 
success  of  their  undertakings  and  are  in  danger 
of  ruin  if  war  breaks  out.  But  they  do  at  times 
stand  to  gain  enormous  sums  by  concessions 
and  monopolies  and  by  control  over  materials 
which  are  the  subject  of  an  intense  demand 
from  great  masses  of  people.  And  no  doubt 
one  way  in  which  they  will  seek  to  get  these 
monopolies  and  controls  is  by  putting  pressure 
on  Governments  for  so-called  patriotic  reasons 
to  exclude  foreign  competition.  This  is  a  very 
real  danger. 

The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  has 
not  dared  to  insist  on  free  trade.  Obviously  it 
could  not,  since  the  majority  of  the  member 
nations  are  against  free  trade.  But  it  does  lay 
down  certain  rules  to  check  aggressive  pro- 
tection. 

All  the  territories  transferred  by  the  war  from 

the  possession  of  Germany  and  Turkey  to  their 

conquerors  are  subjected  to  the  principle  of 

mandate.    They  are  not  held  as  possessions. 

no 


CAUSES  OF  STRIFE 

They  are  held  "as  a  sacred  trust  for  civiliza- 
tion" with  the  express  purpose  of  securing  the 
"well-being  and  development"  of  the  native 
populations.  In  particular,  the  mandatories 
agree  to  guarantee  "equal  opportunities  for  the 
trade  and  commerce  of  other  members  of  the 
League."  As  the  membership  of  the  League  is 
increased,  this  will  practically  ensure  the  "  open 
door"  to  all  nations  in  the  mandated  areas.  It 
seems  also  clearly  to  forbid  the  establishment 
of  national  monopolies.  If  a  mandatory  finds 
copper-mines  or  oil-wells  in  its  territory,  it  is 
bound  to  develop  them  as  "a  trust  for  civiliza- 
tion." Any  profit  it  receives  must  be  in  the 
nature  of  wages  for  work  done.  A  mandatory 
may  not  exclude  or  hamper  the  trade  of  another 
member  of  the  League  by  tariffs,1  much  less 
keep  the  oil  for  the  exclusive  use  of  itself  and 
its  friends,  as  is  at  present  proposed  by  England 
and  France  in  Mesopotamia.  The  condemna- 
tion of  this  proposal  by  the  Assembly  of  the 

1  Except  in  Mandates  C  (Pacific  Islands,  etc.),  where 
Australia  successfully  refused  to  submit  to  any  economic  re- 
strictions. See,  however,  the  definite  pledge  given  by  the 
Allied  Reply,  p.  78,  above. 

Ill 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

League  in  November,  1920,  backed  by  a  vigor- 
ous protest  from  the  United  States,  has,  it  may 
be  hoped,  made  such  a  violation  of  the  Cove- 
nant impossible. 

In  territories  not  mandated  as  a  result  of  the 
war,  but  otherwise  similar  to  the  mandated 
areas,  such  as  the  pre-war  colonies  of  the  vari- 
ous Powers,  these  rules,  of  course,  do  not  hold. 
Yet  it  may  be  hoped  that  at  least  they  will  be 
recognized  as  good  rules,  to  which  approxima- 
tion should  be  made  as  circumstances  permit. 

In  all  their  dealings,  moreover,  members  of 
the  League  agree  (Article  XXIII)  to  "secure 
and  maintain  freedom  of  communications  and 
of  transit,  and  equitable  treatment  for  the  com- 
merce of  all  members  of  the  League."  The  lan- 
guage of  this  article  is  a  little  vague.  One  can 
trace  in  it  the  influence  of  a  struggle.  But  at 
least  it  forbids  tariff  wars,  and  it  gives  the 
League  a  handle  for  interference  in  case  of  any 
very  great  iniquity.  It  does  not  forbid  national 
monopolies;  but  a  monopoly  in  foodstuffs 
which  came  near  to  inflicting  famine  on  other 
members  of  the  League  would,  under  it,  at 
112 


CAUSES  OF  STRIFE 

least  give  cause  for  remark.  And  no  clause, 
however  strong,  could  in  practice  be  sure  of 
attaining  more.  The  League  has  to  be  built 
out  of  nations  as  they  already  exist,  and  the 
rules  of  the  League  out  of  their  public  opinion. 
The  real  danger  here,  as  in  so  many  other  cases, 
lies  not  in  the  caution  and  moderation  of  the 
language  used  in  the  Covenant,  but  first  in  the 
questionable  sincerity  of  the  nations  in  carry- 
ing out  the  pledges  signed  by  their  representa- 
tives, and  secondly  in  the  possibility  that, 
through  ill-will,  or  fear,  or  self-interest,  or  mob- 
passion,  or  some  other  disastrous  influence, 
the  ex-enemy  Powers  be  not  quickly  included  in 
the  League.  Not  until  all  Central  Europe  is  in 
the  League  can  the  world  begin  to  breathe 
freely. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

WE  have  considered  many  parts  of  the  world 
and  many  aspects  of  the  present  world  settle- 
ment to  see  what  seeds  of  future  war  may  now 
be  germinating  and  what  means  we  have  of 
making  them  harmless.  And  in  every  case  we 
are  brought  back  to  the  one  great  creative  idea 
which  this  war  has  produced,  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. The  earlier  notions  of  the  League,  as 
issued,  for  example,  about  the  year  1909  by 
certain  American  bodies,  centred  upon  the  de- 
velopment of  compulsory  mediation  or  arbitra- 
tion and  the  setting  up  of  a  recognized  perma- 
nent Court  of  International  Law.  The  flaw  in 
this  conception,  operating  alone,  is  a  certain 
rigidity  and  barrenness.  It  left  states  to  work 
separately  until  they  quarrelled  or  saw  a  quar- 
rel approaching,  and  only  then,  when  the  at- 
mosphere was  already  bad,  it  expected  them  to 
meet  and  accept  arbitration.  A  great  addition 

114 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

to  this  was  Sir  Edward  Grey's  conception,  al- 
ready put  in  practice  during  the  Balkan  Wars, 
of  an  extended  entente  cordiale  embracing  all 
Europe  and  America.  In  his  time  France  and 
England,  England  and  America,  England  and 
Italy,  had  formed  a  habit  of  cordiality  and 
frank  dealing.  When  any  trouble  arose,  the 
ambassadors  had  the  habit  of  meeting  freely 
and  discussing  the  trouble  with  perfect  frank- 
ness, almost  as  members  of  the  same  Ministry 
might  do.  This  tendency  was  helped  by  the 
enormous  increase  in  international  conferences, 
commissions,  and  bureaux.  And  during  the 
Balkan  crisis  of  1912-13  it  was  in  process  of 
being  extended  to  include  Germany.  Thus 
there  was  the  habit  of  frequent  cooperation 
and  mutual  confidence.  Unfortunately,  this 
friendly  spirit  depended  on  all  parties  being 
generally  content  with  the  present  condition  of 
affairs;  Germany  was  not  content,  and  so  the 
entente  idea  was  balked.  Under  the  League  the 
nations  are  already  forming  a  habit  of  consul- 
tation and  coSperation  on  non-controversial 
matters  which  should  be  of  immense  help  in 
"5 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

dealing  with  differences  when  they  arise.  An- 
other great  formative  idea  was  contributed  by 
General  Smuts,  the  principle  of  the  mandate. 
He  foresaw  that  there  would  be  at  the  end  of 
the  war  an  immense  appropriation  of  tropical 
colonies;  he  knew  that  the  rivalry  of  the  Great 
Powers  for  the  possession  of  such  colonies  was 
one  of  the  chief  sources  of  international  strife; 
and  he  saw  that  the  right  outlet  was  to  put  an 
end  to  the  treatment  of  colonies  as  "posses- 
sions" or  mere  sources  of  wealth  to  the  coloniz- 
ing Power.  The  populations  that  are  not  able 
to  stand  alone  should  be  taken  in  trust  by  the 
whole  League  of  Nations,  which  should  ap- 
point a  particular  Power  in  each  particular  case 
to  carry  out  the  trust.  Again,  the  great  stirring 
of  discontent  among  the  labouring  classes  in 
almost  all  parts  of  the  world  led  to  the  forma- 
tion of  a  special  International  Commission  on 
Labour,  which  has  so  far  met  with  great  suc- 
cess. It  will  in  general  have  the  effect  of  rais- 
ing the  conditions  of  the  most  backward  peoples 
to  something  like  the  level  of  the  best. 

And  lastly,  when  all  these  things  were  in 
116 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

train,  the  policy  for  which  both  Great  Britain 
and  the  late  Czar  of  Russia  had  striven  so  long 
and  vainly  would  at  last  become  feasible,  and 
the  nations  might  consent  to  disarm. 

Thus  the  Covenant  of  the  League,  an  unpre- 
tentious but  well-considered  document,  the 
result  of  repeated  criticism  and  study  by  many 
of  the  best  minds  in  Europe  and  America,  at- 
tempts to  meet  and  check  all  the  visible  and 
predictable  causes  of  war. 

There  should  be  no  wars  of  ambition.  They 
are  to  be  met  by  absolute  coercion.  The  League 
can  make  it  certain  that  deliberate  war  under- 
taken for  national  aggrandizement  will  end, 
not  in  profit,  but  in  ruinous  loss. 

There  should  be  no  wars  caused  by  the  irre- 
sistible desire  to  escape  from  foreign  oppression 
or  intolerable  conditions.  They  are  made  un- 
necessary by  provisions  enabling  any  oppressed 
nation  to  lay  its  case  before  the  Assembly  or 
Council  and  obtain  such  redress  as  the  most 
disinterested  tribunal  can  give. 

A  war  which  is  caused  by  the  emergence  of 
some  clash  of  interest  or  unforeseen  dispute  be- 
117 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tween  two  states  cannot,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
be  made  absolutely  impossible.  The  League 
opposes  to  that  danger,  not  a  blank  wall,  but, 
as  it  were,  a  series  of  springs  calculated  to  ex- 
haust its  force;  a  court  for  points  of  law,  media- 
tion for  points  of  policy,  compulsory  delay  and 
reconsideration  for  all  disputes  whatsoever.  It 
will  be  a  strange  dispute  which,  given  honest 
intentions  on  both  sides,  lasts  through  all  the 
checks  provided  by  Articles  XII  to  XVII  and 
plunges  nations  into  war  at  the  end  of  them. 

Wars  caused  by  rivalry  for  the  possession  of 
colonies  and  rebellions  caused  in  colonies  by 
unjust  exploitation  are,  as  far  as  regards  man- 
dated areas,  provided  against  by  Article  XXII ; 
for  the  other  colonial  territories,  which  do  not 
come  under  a  mandate,  at  least  the  way  of 
safety  is  shown. 

Wars  caused,  or  made  more  likely,  by  the 
mutual  prejudices  of  nations,  by  their  habit  of 
working  always  apart  and  in  secrecy,  are  met  by 
the  immense  field  of  international  cooperation 
which  the  League  proposes,  and  its  absolute  in- 
sistence upon  frank  interchange  of  information. 
118 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

Wars  caused  by  exclusive  tariffs  or  national 
monopolies  of  material  are  in  part  provided 
against  by  Articles  XXII  and  XXIII  and  in 
part  by  XI. 

Wars  which  might  be  caused  by  domestic 
revolutions,  as  in  Russia,  are  made  less  likely 
by  the  Labour  Commission,  which  assures  a 
remedy  for  any  labour  conditions  in  a  particular 
country  which  are  so  bad  as  to  incur  the  active 
condemnation  of  the  world. 

But  it  is  impossible  by  mere  enumeration  to 
be  sure  of  meeting  all  the  causes  from  which 
some  new  war  may  start.  The  League,  in  the 
last  resort,  falls  back  on  the  mutual  trust  and 
good-will  of  its  members,  and  particularly  of 
its  members'  representatives,  secured  partly  by 
the  common  interest  in  peace  and  partly  by  the 
habit  of  coSperation  for  ordinary  affairs.  The 
esprit  de  corps  of  the  League's  permanent  Secre- 
tariat, with  a  professional  interest  in  the  pres- 
ervation of  peace  and  good-will,  is  a  new  and 
important  factor  in  the  world's  life.  Any  mem- 
ber of  the  League  has  the  right  to  bring  to  the 
attention  of  the  Assembly  or  Council  "any  cir- 
119 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

cumstance  whatever  affecting  international  re- 
lations which  threatens  to  disturb  international 
peace  or  the  good  understanding  between  na- 
tions upon  which  peace  depends." 

In  America  the  Covenant  of  the  League  is 
apt  to  be  represented  as  a  terribly  drastic  and 
tyrannical  document.  Cartoons  show  John 
Bull,  or  some  equally  repulsive  abstraction, 
dressed  in  khaki,  dragging  away  American 
youths  to  fight  enemies  of  the  League  in  remote 
parts  of  Asia  or  Africa.  But  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic  it  is  generally  criticized  for  not  being 
drastic  enough.  It  does  not  make  war  formally 
impossible.  It  does  not  bind  all  its  members  to 
make  war  on  any  Covenant-breaker.  It  does 
not  even  bind  any  member  of  the  League  to  ac- 
cept the  decision  of  the  majority.  It  leaves  its 
members  almost  as  free  as  if  they  were  outside. 
They  are  pledged  to  accept,  if  they  ask  for  it,  a 
decision  of  the  International  Court;  they  are 
pledged  to  the  principle  of  mandate;  they  are 
pledged  to  boycott  any  deliberate  war-maker. 
But  that  is  practically  all.  The  League's  true 
weapon  is  not  force,  but  publicity. 
120 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

The  truth  is,  and  it  is  a  truth  of  fundamental 
importance  in  political  matters,  that  no  struc- 
ture can  be  more  rigid  than  the  material  of 
which  it  is  made.  Engagements  between  hu- 
man beings  must  needs  be  as  elastic  as  human 
nature  itself.  Had  the  Covenant  laid  down 
that  every  member  of  the  League  was  to  make 
war  or  peace,  or  change  its  foreign  policy,  in 
obedience  to  the  majority  of  the  Council  or  As- 
sembly and  in  disregard  of  the  wishes  of  its 
own  parliament,  the  result  would  have  been 
either  that  no  nations  would  join  such  a  League 
or  that,  if  they  did,  the  League  would  break  at 
the  first  strain. 

The  principles  laid  down  in  the  Covenant 
are,  in  the  judgment  of  the  present  writer, 
principles  long  recognized  and  absolutely  right. 
If  generally  acted  on,  they  will  prevent  war.  If 
generally  neglected  and  broken,  they  will  allow 
wars  to  ensue.  This  fact  seems  to  be  pretty 
generally  recognized  among  the  more  reputable 
statesmen  of  Europe.  But  it  remains  unfortu- 
nately true  that  they  are  principles  implying  a 
considerably  higher  standard  of  international 

121 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

morality  than  has  hitherto  been  consistently 
observed  by  any  nations,  even  the  best.  If  ab- 
solute fidelity  to  the  Covenant  by  all  its  signa- 
tories were  necessary  for  the  peace  of  the  world, 
the  world  would  have  a  very  poor  prospect  be- 
fore it.  What  we  must  aim  at  is  as  much  fidel- 
ity as  possible.  There  are  great  difficulties. 
America  is  absent.  Germany  and  Russia  are 
absent.  France  cannot  yet  quite  escape  from 
her  war  psychology.  But  if  Great  Britain  is 
faithful,  it  will  be  hard  for  other  nations  to  be 
obviously  and  grossly  false.  The  European  neu- 
trals, like  Switzerland,  Holland,  and  Norway, 
will  be  clear  voices  for  justice  and  fair  dealing. 
The  beaten  nations,  when  once  admitted,  will 
probably  be  on  the  same  side,  since  when 
wrong-doing  begins  it  is  the  weak  who  are  first 
to  suffer.  And,  after  all,  all  human  beings  have 
a  strong  dislike  of  injustice,  when  they  do  not 
directly  gain  by  it.  The  great  majority  of  the 
fifty-one  members  of  the  League  will  be  disin- 
terested on  most  questions  of  dispute,  and  will 
therefore  form  a  good  tribunal  of  opinion. 
But  the  mere  clash  of  contrary  selfishnesses 
122 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

produces  no  sound  equilibrium.  The  League 
will  not  succeed  unless  in  some  of  the  great  na- 
tions, above  all  in  Great  Britain,  there  are  at 
the  head  of  affairs  statesmen  who  believe  firmly 
in  the  principles  of  the  League  and  are  capable 
both  of  effort  and  of  self-sacrifice  for  the  sake 
of  them,  and  behind  the  statesmen  a  strong  and 
intelligent  determination  in  the  mass  of  the 
people  to  see  that  the  League  is  made  genuinely 
the  leading  force  in  international  politics. 

The  present  disorder  of  the  world  is  one  of 
those  in  which  the  remedy  is  not  obscure,  but 
perfectly  ascertained.  The  only  difficulty  lies 
in  applying  it.  The  nations  of  the  world  must 
cooperate;  and  for  that  they  must  trust  one 
another;  and  for  that  the  only  way  is  for  each 
Government  separately  to  be  worthy  of  trust. 

It  will  be  long,  no  doubt,  before  this  end  is 
consummated  or  even  approached.  The  fore- 
going pages  have  shown  how  far  from  perfect  is 
the  practice  of  even  the  most  stable  and  ad- 
vanced nations.  And  the  tendencies  set  up  by 
the  war,  with  its  infinite  reactions  and  ramifica- 
tions, are  almost  all  such  as  to  make  vastly 
123 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

more  difficult  in  each  case  the  necessary  effort 
towards  good  faith  and  good-will.  Yet,  if  the 
difficulties  are  greater,  the  necessity  is  greater 
also;  and  after  all  the  war  has  brought  its  in- 
spirations as  well  as  its  corruptions.  The  crav- 
ing for  this  Peace  which  has  not  come  is,  I  be- 
lieve, still  the  unspoken  and  often  unconscious 
motive  of  millions  who  seem,  at  first  glance,  to 
be  only  brawling  for  revenges  or  revolutions ;  it 
lies,  like  a  mysterious  torment,  at  the  heart  of 
this  storm-tossed  and  embittered  world,  crying 
for  it  knows  not  what. 


THE  END 


BOOKS  FOR  FURTHER  READING 

THE  Series  published  by  the  American  Association 
for  International  Conciliation,  1-150,  comprising 
the  text  of  all  the  most  important  official  state- 
ments, treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  dealing  with 
International  Affairs. 

The  League  of  Nations  Union  pamphlets  for  Study 
.  Circles :  The  League  and  its  Guarantees,  by  Gilbert 
Murray;  The  League  in  the  East,  by  Arnold  Toyn- 
bee;  The  League  and  Labour,  by  Delisle  Burns; 
Economic  Functions  of  the  League,  by  Norman 
Angell;  Mandates  and  Empire,  by  Leonard  Woolf ; 
The  Future  of  the  Covenant,  by  G.  Lowes  Dickin- 
son. 

The  League  of  Nations,  Nine  Essays,  by  Viscount 

Grey  and  others.   Oxford  University  Press,  1919. 
The  Idea  of  a  League  of  Nations,  H.  G.  Wells  and 

others,  for  the  Research  Committee  of  the  League 

of  Nations  Union.   Oxford  Press,  1917. 
Economic  Foundations  of  Peace,  J.  L.  Garvin.  Mac- 

millan,  1917. 
Report  of  the  International  Financial  Conference, 

printed  for  the  League  of  Nations.    Brussels, 

1920. 
Complete  Official  Proceedings  of  the  same,  3  vols. 

London  and  Brussels. 
.Report  of  the  Economic  Conference  summoned  by 

the  Fight  the  Famine  Council. 

125 


BOOKS  FOR  FURTHER  READING 

Foreign  Policy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Gilbert  Murray. 

Clarendon  Press,  Oxford. 
A  Century  of  British  Foreign  Policy,  G.  P.  Gooch 

and  Canon  Masterman.  Allen  and  Unwin. 
Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  J.  May- 

nard  Keynes.   Macmillan,  1919. 
The  Making  of  the  Reparation  and  Economic  Sections 

of  the  Treaty,  B.  M.  Baruch.   Harpers,  1920. 
The  Choice  Before  Us,  G.  Lowes  Dickinson.  Allen 

and  Unwin,  1918. 
Causes  of  International  War,  G.  Lowes  Dickinson. 

Swarthmore  Press. 
International  Politics,  Delisle   Burns.     Methuen, 

1920. 
International  Government,  L.  S.  Woolf.   Allen  and 

Unwin. 
Empire  and  Commerce  in  Africa,  L.  S.  Woolf.  Allen 

and  Unwin. 

The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold,  H.  N.  Brailsford.   1913. 
After  the  Peace,  by  H.  N.  Brailsford.    1920. 
The  Eastern  Question,  J.  A.  R.  Marriott.    Oxford 

Press,  1917. 
The  Official  Reports  of  the  First  Meeting  of  the 

Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations,  Nov.  15- 

Dec.   1 8,   1920,  are  most  instructive,  and  will 

probably  be  published  in  book  form. 


€bt 

CAMBRIDGE    .    M  ASSACH  L'»«TTS 
U  .  •  .  A 


IBIS 

•      R'/15? 


A    000178014    7 


